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"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How
BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. ed. 1913).
"Act as if you have faith, and faith will be given you."
UNKNOWN SOURCE
Given the diverse charitable missions of nonprofit organizations and
the high rate of unpaid donor and volunteer service among charitable
nonprofit boards of directors, few would seriously suggest that a
nonprofit corporate director's fiduciary duty of care to oversee
management should exceed that of a for-profit corporate director
counterpart. Most for-profit corporate directors' duty of care breaches
are protected by the business judgment rule and statutory exculpation
clauses.' However, systematic abdication of directorial duties can result
in ruinous unprotected "liability" for for-profit directors through
shareholder derivative suits.2 Unfortunately, abdication and dereliction
are far more common on volunteer nonprofit charitable boards.3
Excepting the largest charitable nonprofit corporations, directors often
1. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01, at 138-39 (1992)
(business judgment rule); see infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text (statutory
exculpation).
2. See Mark Fellows, Note, A Business or a Trust?: Janssen v. Best & Flanagan and
Judicial Review of For-Profit and Nonprofit Board of Directors Decisions, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1503, 1506-08 (2004); see also infra notes 256-60, 279-82, 412-14 and
accompanying text.
3. See Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 131, 133-34 (1993) (discussing recent scandals involving directors and
officers of nonprofit organizations); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 219 & n.1 (2003) (same); Wendy K. Szymanski, An
Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit
Corporations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1305-06 (same).
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view their role as advisory rather than supervisory. Consequently, one
might expect parallel duties of care to have even more ruinous effects in
the charitable nonprofit corporate sector. In fact, this is not true because
most charitable nonprofit corporations do not have shareholders, donors
lack standing to bring fiduciary duty suits, and although state attorneys
general have standing, they lack resources and interest to enforce the
duty of care.5 So, while nonprofit director abdication is far more
common, it is far less likely to result in director liability.
What is the significance of a charitable nonprofit director fiduciary
duty of care if it does not result in any liability consequences? First and
foremost, the duty, properly explained, is eventually internalized tending
to create aspirational care behavior in spite of a lack of breach liability.
Second, every charitable nonprofit corporation is classified either as a
6private foundation or as a public charity for federal tax purposes.
Significantly, these classifications attach monetary liability to
management self-dealing and excess benefit transactions that becomes
monstrous if uncorrected after detection] Moreover, these self-dealing
and excess benefit transactions create potential monetary liability for
charitable nonprofit directors who "knowingly participate" in such
transactions. Specifically, even though charitable nonprofit directors are
not directly involved in the culpable manager's behavior, the charitable
directors will incur monetary penalties if they had a duty to act." The
failure must be due to deliberate inattention, but the intent may be
inferred from the fact that knowledge of the improper behavior would
have likely developed had the director not been systematically absent
from regular directors' meetings.
The 2008 Model Nonprofit Corporation Act creates fiduciary duties of
care for charitable nonprofit corporate directors comparable to those of
4. See Szymanski, supra note 3, at 1325 (discussing criticisms of the independent
director, and noting that "most failures [in the nonprofit context] can be traced to board
laxity").
5. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 256-65 ("A fundamental distinction between the
business corporation, where shareholders have formal legal authority to assume fiduciary
accountability, and the nonprofit organization is the limited nature of standing to sue by
the many classes affected by the nonprofit enterprise .... The attorney general usually has
the responsibility of supervision and oversight of charitable trusts and corporations, and
may maintain such actions as appropriate to protect the public interest. . . . Staffing
problems and a relative lack of interest in monitoring nonprofits make attorney general
oversight more theoretical than deterrent.").
6. See Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of Private
Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 148-54 (2002).
7. See infra Part IV.E.
8. See infra Parts IV.E.La, IV.E.2.a.
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for-profit corporate directors.9 The 2007 draft of the American Law
Institute Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations adopts a
similar approach. 0 While neither drafting project offers compelling
reasons for creating and imposing largely symbolic fiduciary duties of
care, this Article suggests that philosophical, moral, and legal liability
bases do exist and indeed depend upon the existence of such a duty.
Absent the duty, not only would charitable nonprofit corporate director
management behavior likely deteriorate, scandalous behavior would also
likely expand unchecked. The unique combination of state law duty with
federal liability and detection appears to be the most efficient and best
model because it seldom embroils the finances of the nonprofit
corporation for enforcement as in shareholder derivative suits.
An assorted array of other solutions to charitable directorial
abdication has been proposed as well, but all have critical defects
examined in the context of the charitable nonprofit corporation.
Following the Enron-era scandals, the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) was enacted in 2002 and imposed a number of substantive
governance provisions on publicly traded for-profit corporations." These
measures add superficial luster to state law fiduciary duties by making
objectionable management activity and lax board oversight more
apparent to shareholders and the public. But those provisions do not
apply to charitable nonprofit corporations without members or
shareholders, 2 the primary targets of this Article and the largest group of
nonprofit organizations. 3 While a few states have adopted similar
provisions applicable to nonprofits 14 and a few large national charitable
nonprofit corporations have voluntarily elected to comply with SOX, 5
the enforcement paradox continues to plague directorial accountability
for lax charitable management oversight.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The primary purpose of
the Act is "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws." Id.
12. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 244 & n.140 (2004);
see also Szymanski, supra note 3, at 1304.
13. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of
Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830 & n.2 (2003).
14. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
15. See Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should
States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831,
845 (2007); Carrie Johnson, Charities Going Beyond Required Controls to Regain Their
Donors' Confidence, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2005, at El.
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Notwithstanding federal charitable director liability, the system could
be vastly improved, particularly at the management level. While federal
tax law creates monstrous liability against participating managers for
uncorrected self-dealing and excess benefit transactions, the initial
penalty is low and lacks deterrence effect because of low detection
rates.16  Higher initial penalties would discourage transactional
misbehavior even if not detected. Finally, managers are flatly prohibited
from self-dealing transactions in the context of private foundations but
only prohibited from "excess benefit" transactions in the context of
public charities." Given the scandalous behavior in several notorious
charitable management abuse cases, the absolute prohibition applicable
to private foundations ought to be extended to public charities. Finally,
greater public information transparency would mobilize the press to
examine readily accessible documents for violations. News stories can
alert the IRS to otherwise undetected violations. Additionally, both
private foundations and public charities of an identified minimum size
should be required to post charitable exemption applications and annual
IRS filings on their own websites.
This Article argues that the fiduciary duty of care plays an important
role in curbing director misbehavior in the nonprofit context, but that
enforcement mechanisms can be greatly improved. Part I examines the
applicability of SOX to the nonprofit corporate sector, and its
effectiveness as a model of governance reform. Part II explores current
nonprofit corporate governance models, including reform proposals, as
well as various legal theories to analyze design features of legislative
reform proposals. Because those governance models are patterned after
for-profit governance models, Part III explores normative for-profit and
nonprofit corporate governance fiduciary duty constraints as developed
under modern Delaware law. Part IV analyzes the important extant
federal tax constraints on self-dealing transactions applicable to
charitable private foundations and public charities.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICABILITY OF SOX
Most nonprofit governance legislative reforms, best practices efforts,
and legal scholarship on the issue share a common theme but diverge
regarding appropriate solutions to extant problems. The familiar pattern
identifies the obvious connection between for-profit and nonprofit
corporate governance standards, 8 references similar public scandals19
16. See discussion infra Parts IV.E.I.b, IV.E.2.b.
17. See discussion infra Parts IV.E.I.b, IV.E.2.b.
18. Early case law determined that charitable corporations such as colleges and
universities are similar in nature to private corporations and dissimilar to public
2008]
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involving management self-dealing, °  and analyzes federal SOX
legislative reforms designed to restore public trust and confidence in the
public securities markets in the for-profit corporate sector. Severe
criticism of the design, implementation, and maintenance costs, along
with the conventional wisdom regarding the utilitarian ineffectiveness of
SOX in the for-profit sector,21 inevitably leads to the conclusion that state
corporations, meaning that the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits state
modification of the charitable private corporation charter. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 616-17 (1819); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. As a
consequence, "the development of business corporation law in the nineteenth century
provided guidance for the internal operating rules of charitable corporations." James J.
Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34
EMORY L.J. 617, 642 (1985); see also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The
Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 457, 511 (1996).
19. For a discussion of a recent notorious case involving the CEO of the New York
Stock Exchange, see generally Rachel Penski, Note, The Case of CEO Richard Grasso and
the NYSE: Proposals for Controlling Executive Compensation at Public Nonprofit
Corporations, 58 VAND. L. REV. 339 (2005). The New York Stock Exchange is a New
York nonprofit corporation with 1366 member-shareholders holding or leasing "seats" to
floor trading. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(Mazzarelli, J., dissenting). The suit was ultimately dismissed because the Attorney
General lacked statutory authority or parens patriae standing under New York corporate
nonprofit law to pursue the case. Id. at 51-53 (majority opinion).
20. Corporate management self-dealing, and its effects on the nonprofit world, has
generated much scholarship. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 3, at 219-21 & n.1; Marion R.
Fremont-Smith, Pillaging of Charitable Assets: Embezzlement and Fraud, 46 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 333, 340-42 (2004); Glenn T. Troyer, David E. Jose & Andrea D.
Brashear, Governance Issues For Nonprofit Healthcare Organizations and The
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 175, 180-82 (2004);
Gilkeson, supra note 15, at 832-33; see also Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the
Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1981, 1982 (2007) ("The United States boasts the largest nonprofit sector in the
world, and that sector continues to grow. The Internal Revenue Service, the primary
federal regulator of nonprofit organizations, currently oversees 1.6 million tax-exempt
organizations holding $2.4 trillion in assets. Unfortunately, this huge sector of the
economy recently has been pummeled with a spate of now all-too-familiar corporate
scandals. In the seven years preceding 2002, officers and directors of major charitable
organizations misappropriated at least $1.28 billion from 152 nonprofit organizations. To
make matters worse, a recent Chronicle of Philanthropy study contends that this figure,
which is based upon newspaper reports, significantly underestimates the scope of abuses
within the nonprofit community." (footnotes omitted)).
21. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251,
291-307 (2005) (analyzing the high costs and "modest" benefits of SOX-related corporate
governance changes); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 279, 280 (criticizing SOX as a regulatory response to market failure); Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1526-28 (2005) (criticizing SOX substantive corporate governance
provisions); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years 20-21 (Univ. of I11. Coll.
[Vol. 57:701
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legislative efforts should abstain from adopting and imposing some or all
2SOX reforms on nonprofit organizations. Notwithstanding a few
notorious failed legislative efforts in New York, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont,23 only a few
states have successfully adopted SOX-style provisions, including
624 22 2 8California, Connecticut, Kansas," Maine, New Hampshire and West
Virginia.29  Most only apply to large nonprofit organizations. For
example, California's statute applies only to nonprofit organizations with
annual gross revenues exceeding $2 million.3°  To improve public
reputation and rejuvenate public donor support, a few large nonprofit
organizations voluntarily adopted some or all of the SOX reforms.3"
of Law, Ill. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE05-016, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=746884 (calling SOX "ill-
advised" and arguing that "markets will do a better job than government regulators in
responding to corporate fraud"). But see Robert A. Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 703-05 (2007)
(arguing that the costs of implementation and compliance associated with SOX section 404
are overstated while its real benefits are undervalued); Robert A. Prentice & David B.
Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received
Evidence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1858-59 (2007) (arguing that academic literature and
empirical evidence generally support SOX).
22. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit
Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 86-87 (2007) (arguing that independent
boards are not the best way to achieve "mission integrity" in the nonprofit sector);
Mulligan, supra note 20, at 1996-2002 (arguing that SOX-like reforms will be of little value
in improving non-profit governance); Reiser, supra note 12, at 208-09 (advocating for
increased nonprofit self-regulation instead of additional government regulation); Dana
Brakman Reiser, There Ought To Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative
Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 606 (2005) (questioning the
ability of SOX's disclosure-based reforms to "transform the accountability of the
nonprofit sector"); Szymanski, supra note 3, at 1315-18 ("Our eyebrows should raise
initially at the idea of applying Sarbanes-Oxley to not-for-profits due to a mismatch
between the stated goals of the Act and the goals to be served by reforming nonprofit law.
The main justifications behind the Act's passage-protection of investors and the accuracy
of SEC disclosures-are not at issue in the nonprofit area.").
23. See Mulligan, supra note 20, at 1983 & n.il.
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17510.5 (West 1997 & Supp. 2008); CAL. GOV'T.
CODE §§ 12581-12599.7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-190b, -190c, -190f, -190h (West 2006).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1763, 17-6002 (Supp. 2006).
27. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5004 (Supp. 2007).
28. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:28111-a to -b (LexisNexis 2008).
29. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14 (LexisNexis 2004).
30. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 12586(e) (West 2005).
31. See Gilkeson, supra note 15, at 845; Johnson, supra note 15.
20081
Catholic University Law Review
However, some commentators argue that smaller nonprofit organizations
should receive more compassionate treatment."
One common theme against imposing SOX on nonprofit organizations
is that such state legislative reforms critically fail to account for the
mission-diverse stakeholder nature of the nonprofit corporate board,33 as
compared to the unified shareholder profit mission of the for-profit
corporate board.34 Indeed, SOX criticisms have led some to question
whether a liability system of gatekeeper reputation deterrence is as
effective as systems that reward good governance such as whistleblower
provisions,3" release from SOX requirements for "honest corporations, '36
and payments to outside directors37 and even lawyers for vigilant
conduct.3a  Even fewer scholars question whether liability deterrence
32. See, e.g., David W. Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability
Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967, 968-69 (1996)
(contending that "small, charitable nonprofits ... should be the beneficiaries of more
lenient standards for director conduct").
33. See generally Kevin Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. Bus.
ETHICS 245 (2000) (examining whether "businesses should consider the interests of
stakeholders"); Tara J. Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate
Citizenship, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619 (2003) ("Although stakeholder thinking has
frequently been construed to be in conflict with the legal principle of shareholder primacy,
there are indications that stakeholder thinking does not inherently conflict with the law."
(footnote omitted)); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and Sustainability: An Argument for
Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 363
(2007) ("Although corporate law has traditionally emphasized stockholder primacy,
current thinking about the law and the role of business in society emphasizes attention to
stakeholder considerations." (footnote omitted)).
34. See Boozang, supra note 22, at 85-86; Mulligan, supra note 20, at 2002-07.
35. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111-14
(2007), cited in Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 323 n.2 (2007); see also Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and
Sticks": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 318-22 (2004), cited
in Cunningham, supra, at 323 n.2; Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model
to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1133-38, cited in
Cunningham, supra, at 323 n.2.
36. See Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest
Corporations, 62 Bus. LAW. 161, 171-73, 189-92 (2006), cited in Cunningham, supra note
35, at 323 n.1.
37. See Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1691-93, 1703-07 (2007), cited in Cunningham, supra note 35, at 323
n.3.
38. See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant
Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825,
1837-38 (2004), cited in Cunningham, supra note 35, at 323 n.4.
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actually discourages directors from performing their legitimate oversight
functions, such as detecting management fraud.39
Moreover, beyond peradventure, state-imposed SOX reforms would
be disproportionately burdensome to even large nonprofit corporations.
Publicly traded corporations were subject to existing audited financial
statement requirements before SOX.40 In addition, they are better
equipped to attract financially sophisticated board members, to
reasonably compensate them, and to adopt special independent board
committees for at least executive compensation matters. Nonprofit
corporate board members are mostly unpaid volunteers, generally less
financially sophisticated, rarely benefit from audited financial
information, and even more rarely utilize independent board committees
to consider executive compensation and special financial matters .
Worse, unlike a for-profit board annually elected by shareholders but
arguably "captured" by management (because management largely
selects the slate of directors for shareholder vote),42 the non-profit board
is subject to an even higher degree of management capture because the
board is self-perpetuating and not annually elected.43
To make matters even less comparable, for-profit corporations
commonly employ stock options for executive and board compensation,
whereas nonprofit corporations are not publicly traded and thus do not
utilize stock options." Self-interested shareholders use derivative suits to
39. See generally Cunningham, supra note 35 ("Previous literature on gatekeepers
concentrated on designing a liability system to achieve optimal deterrence while relying
largely on gatekeeper reputation as a self-enforcement device. This Article reviews the
previous literature, noting inherent limitations of reputation and liability threats, including
how the latter discourage gatekeepers from performing desirable services such as fraud
detection." (footnote omitted)).
40. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26) (2000) (requiring that audited balance sheets
and income statements be filed with a securities registration statement).
41. See Barrett, supra note 32, at 967, 970; Karyn R. Vanderwarren, Financial
Accountability in Charitable Organizations: Mandating an Audit Committee Function, 77
CHI-KENT L. REV. 963, 966 (2002).
42. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election
of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 464-67 (2007) (explaining how management
effectively elects the board of directors through the proxy process).
43. See Reiser, supra note 13, at 829-30 ("For today's nonprofits, internal democracy
is optional .... [S]elf-perpetuating boards are the norm and members are rare, particularly
among charitable or public benefit nonprofits.").
44. See Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 836 (2004)
("[S]tock options became the centerpiece of the vast majority of executive compensation
packages in the early 1990s."); Victor B. Flatt, Notice and Comment for Nonprofit
Organizations, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 65, 65-67 (2002) ("[C]orporate officers in for-profit
corporations usually have incentives to maximize corporate wealth . . . through stock
ownership, deferred salary, stock options, or similar compensation. The nonprofit faces no
such market discipline .... ").
20081
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actively police board malfeasance and nonfeasance resulting in poor
stock performance.45 Lack of similar reliable metrics in the nonprofit
46sector, coupled with lack of donor standing to bring derivative suits,
4 7
exacerbates the problems associated with measuring and policing board
malfeasance and nonfeasance. Functionally, only state attorney general
charitable divisions, which are often understaffed and underfunded, have
jurisdiction to challenge such behavior and are generally more interested
in policing solicitation behavior than other board conduct. 8 Moreover,
45. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1748-50 (2004) (arguing that despite
procedural barriers and a decline in use, shareholder derivative actions still have an
important role to play in policing corporate misconduct in both private and public
corporations).
46. See generally Elizabeth K. Keating, et al., Assessing Financial Vulnerability in the
Nonprofit Sector, (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Hauser Ctr. for
Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 27, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
647662 (comparing two methods used to test nonprofit financial vulnerability by utilizing
bankruptcy forecasting methodology from the for-profit sector).
47. Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of
Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2007); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor
Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1093, 1143 (2005); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 497, 606-07 (1981); Mulligan, supra note 20, at 1988; Brenda Boykin, Note,
The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative
Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999, 999 (1985). Generally, it is the state attorney general who is
responsible for enforcing nonprofit director fiduciary duties. Rob Atkinson, Unsettled
Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L.
655, 657 (1998); Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in
the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 42 (1993); Fishman, supra note 3, at 259-60;
Craig Kaufman, Sympathy for the Devil's Advocate: Assisting the Attorney General When
Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 707 (2006);
Joshua B. Nix, The Things People Do When No One Is Looking: An Argument for the
Expansion of Standing in the Charitable Sector, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 147, 167, 176-78
(2005); David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Fiduciary:
A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
131, 132-33 (2000); Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the
Duties of Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care
Systems, 53 RUTGERs L. REV. 979, 1020-22 (2001).
48. See Fishman, supra note 3, at 261-62, 268; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The
Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV.
433, 449-60 (1960). See generally Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004) (analyzing the
current framework for charity law regulation); Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of
Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605
(1991) (discussing the regulation of charitable fund-raising); Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit
Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1312 (2002) (reviewing NORMAN I.
SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM (2001)). Interestingly, the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 generated special tax legislation granting charitable organizations
greater latitude in spending donor funds to relieve victims' suffering. Victims of Terrorism
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even if donors are granted standing, there is reason to question whether
they will adequately police nonprofit governance. After all, unlike
shareholders, charitable nonprofit donors make a gift and generally
expect no return of or on their investment, other than reasonable
advancement of charitable goals. Indeed, the primary expected return is
in the form of an existing tax deduction and that return generally exists
regardless of lackluster nonprofit corporate governance. 9 While various
charitable watchdog groups do analyze nonprofit governance and publish
the effectiveness of the charity in implementing the charitable gift, 0 most
donors pay little attention or are simply not aware of this information.
Major news scandals may, however, affect donor generosity toward a
scandal-heavy nonprofit organization because of the public's lack of trust
in the organization.
Given these differences, especially the lack of enforcement measures,
what justifies the added costs of SOX or any other liability system
governance reforms for nonprofit organizations? This question remains
particularly important given that charitable nonprofit organizations are
already subject to a form of federalism not applicable to for-profit
corporations. Although SOX does not apply to charitable nonprofit
organizations, federal tax regimes are in place to police management and
director self-dealing in private foundations51  and excess benefit
transactions in public charities." The effectiveness of these federal tax
measures is difficult to assess because little empirical evidence exists.
Some question whether financial penalties are adequately or even
appropriately enforced by a revenue-oriented agency rather than a
governance-oriented agency.53 Moreover, the federal tax regime bases
enforcement decisions on unaudited, late, inaccurate, and inadequate
Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 104(a), 115 Stat. 2427, 2431 (2002); see also
Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar Above Twin Towers: A Federal Income
Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus Donations Raised for a
Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1829 & n.l (2003).
49. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000).
50. See, e.g., Council of Better Business Bureaus, About BBB Wise Giving Alliance,
http://us.bbb.org/wwwroot/sitepage.aspx?site=113&id=cf401757-e890-4352-8d73-829eb595
de21 (last visited Apr. 28, 2008).
51. I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 2007).
52. Id. § 4958(c).
53. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxation and Corporate
Governance: An Economic Approach, (Max Planck Inst., Conference on Taxation and
Corporate Governance 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983563 ("The basic
intuition for how corporate governance and taxation interact is that tax avoidance
demands complexity and obfuscation to prevent detection. The characteristics, in turn,
can become a shield for managerial opportunism.").
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financial information provided initially on the Form 102314 exemption
application and annually on the Form 990" annual report. The
information may simply not be trustworthy to disclose adequately
problematic self-dealing to the federal tax agency or the public with
general access to the same information.
The only problem is that all the problems remain. This may merely
suggest that reform agendas have yet to develop appropriate reforms
that will truly result in improved management and director behavior in
the nonprofit sector. It may also suggest a more fundamentally flawed
assumption that corrective legislation is truly effective in altering
undesirable human behavior. After all, the nonprofit sector benefits
from, or labors under, an altruistic agenda not applicable to for-profit
corporations. One generally expects better behavior in such a context
than in a money-seeking for-profit corporation.
This Article generally posits that while SOX may present some
reasonable reform options, it was ill-designed in the first place to solve
even the problems in the for-profit sector. Generally, SOX implemented
specific mandates designed to fix specific problems through enhanced
information disclosure, transparency, and audit committee independence
without an adequate foundation in rule theory or policy. Accordingly,
SOX may simply become one of the most expensive and least effective
reform efforts of the modern era.
In order to avoid similar mistakes in the nonprofit sector, it will be
necessary to develop a deeper appreciation for the real world disconnect
between non-legal norms and the moral drivers behind nonprofit board
governance generally and ethical decision-making specifically. In this
environment, managerial and director behavior present an emerging
personal calculus that balances personal gain against detection and
exposure. This makes nonprofit management and director behavior
significantly more suspect under current legal norms because detection
and exposure is low and personal gain from self-dealing is high. If true,
only a focus on development of a proper moral compass will correct the
behavior. The best that legal norms can offer in the short-term is
increased detection and liability exposure to shift the personal calculus in
favor of moral behavior and ethical decision-making. Unless and until
nonprofit directors adhere to a moral philosophy associating moral
54. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Form 1023: Application for
Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (rev.
June 2006), available at http:lwww.irs.govlpub/irs-pdf/flO23.pdf [hereinafter Form 1023].
55. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Form 990: Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf
[hereinafter Form 990].
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behavior with legal behavior, change is incremental at best and
prescriptive at worst. Notwithstanding a plethora of legal rules,
nonprofit management will continue to behave in rational self-dealing
behavior in the shadows, provided that short-term personal financial
gains outweigh the risk of long-term reputation costs associated with
being detected and exposed.
II. NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MORAL NORMS,
& LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
This Article assumes that most large nonprofit organizations are
organized as nonprofit corporations and not as unincorporated
56associations or trusts. State law nonprofit corporate board governance
responsibilities are essentially the same as those that apply to the for-
profit corporate director. Differences exist primarily in the nature and
extent of federal laws and state law fiduciary duty enforcement
mechanisms. One area of overlap concerns the problem of self-dealing.
As discussed in the next three Parts, self-dealing is treated the same
under state law for both for-profit and nonprofit corporations. However,
federal tax law generally imposes a stricter rule and penalty against self-
dealing in the context of charitable private foundations." Indeed, the
disparate treatment of self-dealing alone might create questions
regarding the most appropriate treatment. For example, should the
federal tax penalties on self-dealing in the context of private foundations
and public charities be relaxed in favor of the corporate model that
emphasizes overall fairness to the corporation?18 The for-profit
corporate fairness standard has been urged as a replacement for the trust
sole interest rule.59 Others argue against such a transformation.60 The
56. See Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do With It?, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 641 n.1 (2005) ("While we do not know how many charities today
are trusts and how many are corporations, the percentage of trusts is assumed to be
small.").
57. See infra Part IV.D-E.
58. See generally DeMott, supra note 3 (questioning whether "socially desirable
consequences [will] follow if standards common in the for-profit setting apply to directors'
self-dealing in the nonprofit context").
59. See generally John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole
Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005) (proposing reform of the sole interest
rule to reflect the principle that "the trustee must act in the beneficiary's best interest, but
not necessarily in the beneficiary's sole interest," and stating that "[o]verlaps of interest
that are consistent with the best interest off the beneficiary should be allowed").
60. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A
Response to Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541 (2005) (arguing that
"Professor Langbein fails to prove that the no further inquiry rule is problematic, or that
his proposed 'best-interest' defense would make trust beneficiaries better off"); Melanie
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discussion below first summarizes the state law regarding fiduciary duties
from the perspective of the applicable model acts.
A. 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987 (1987
RMNPCA) section 8.30(a) provides the normative standards for
nonprofit directors." A director must discharge directorial duties: "[(i)]
in good faith; [(ii)] with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and [(iii)] in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation."62 In discharging these duties, "a director is entitled to rely
on information, opinions, reports, or statements."63 These include
financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or
presented by:
[(i)] one or more officers or employees of the corporation
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and
competent in the matters presented;
[(ii)] legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to
matters the director reasonably believes are within the person's
professional or expert competence; and
B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J.
67 (2005) ("This article argues that characterizing trustees' fiduciary duties as pure 'default
rules' too easily equates trusts with contracts and blinds academics and courts to the need
to develop a coherent theory about the extent to which fiduciary duties can be
modified."). Although the commercial-seeking character of for-profit corporations may
justify conflict-of-interest transactions, there is less to be said for such transactions in the
context of a charitable organization with a mission-diverse charitable aspiration.
Arguments on both sides attempt to dispute whether the sole interest rule reduces the
agency costs in trusts; that is, the cost of monitoring the trustee to determine whether his
conduct is in the best interests of the "agent" beneficiaries. See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust
Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761-62 (2006)
(discussing the question of who are the true principals of a trust). Unfortunately, unlike
for-profit corporations where directors act as agents for shareholder principals, charitable
nonprofit corporations do not have shareholders, and thus the agency cost argument is
much less effective. For an ongoing discussion, see Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law,
Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713
(2006), which argues for disparate statutory fiduciary treatment between professional and
non-professional trustees. This argument has obvious analogies to the differences
between professional board members of publicly-traded corporations and neophyte
directors of, at least, smaller charitable non-profit corporation board members.
61. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1987).
62. Id. § 8.30(a)(1)-(3).
63. Id. § 8.30(b).
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[(iii)] a committee of the board of which the director is not a
member, as to matters within its jurisdiction, if the director
reasonably believes the committee merits confidence. 64
Importantly, provided a director acts in compliance with these duties, the
director is not liable to the corporation or any other person for any
action taken or not taken. 65
In addition, nonprofit directors are subject to conflict of interest
regulations.6" A conflict of interest transaction is defined as a transaction
between a nonprofit corporation and a director with a direct or indirectS 67
interest in the transaction. However, a safe harbor provision dictates
that such a transaction is not a basis for imposing director liability if a
majority of disinterested directorss granted ex ante approval69 of the
transaction following disclosure of all material facts7 ° and with a goodS 71
faith reasonable belief that the transaction was fair to the corporation.
The state attorney general has the power to make a determination that
the transaction was fair either ex ante or ex post.72  Absent ex ante
approval, the conflicted director may avoid liability by establishing that
the transaction was actually fair to the nonprofit corporation.73
An optional statutory exculpatory provision provides that the personal
liability of a director for monetary damages involving a breach of these
duties may be limited or eliminated provided the provision is• • 74
affirmatively stated in the articles of incorporation. However, such a
provision may not limit liability for: (i) "any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to the corporation or its members;, 75 (ii) "acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law;, 76 (iii) "any transaction from which a director derived an
improper personal economic benefit;, 77 or (iv) improper conflict of
64. Id. § 8.30(b)(1)-(3).
65. Id. § 8.30(d).
66. Id. § 8.31.
67. Id. § 8.31(a).
68. Id. § 8.31(e). If an interested director attends and votes at the meeting, that does
not extinguish the otherwise proper approval of a majority of the remaining board. Id.
69. Id. § 8.31(b)(1).
70. Id. § 8.31(b)(1)(i).
71. Id. § 8.31(b)(1)(ii).
72. Id. § 8.31(b)(2)(i).
73. Id. § 8.31(a).
74. Id. § 2.02(b)(5). This provision is listed as an alternative provision of the 1987
RMNPCA.
75. Id. § 2.02(b)(5)(i).
76. Id. § 2.02(b)(5)(ii).
77. Id. § 2.02(b)(5)(iii).
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interest transactions, improper loans, or unlawful distributions." In
addition, a charitable corporation may indemnify a director for any
liability incurred in an official capacity, provided that the director: (i)
acted in good faith; and (ii) reasonably believed the conduct to be in the
best interest of the charitable corporation, or at least not adverse to its
best interests.7 ' However, indemnification is flatly prohibited when the
director is liable because of "improper" financial benefit. 80 On the other
hand, indemnification for expenses and legal fees is mandatory if the
director was successful in the suit.
8'
Unfortunately, these codifications creating statutory agency
relationships do little to clarify or articulate the true contours of fiduciary
duty breach and liability. That gloss is left to the common law. Worse,
these statutory norms purport to authorize transactions that federal tax
law flatly prohibits. This creates difficult implementation problems for
advisors and board members. For example, as discussed in Part IV
below, federal excise tax law prohibits self-dealing transactions between
management and board members in the context of a charitable private
foundation. Any such transaction, while permitted under state law if fair,
will result in the imposition of serious financial tax penalties upon the
participant (but not the charitable organization itself). Presumably,
because the federal tax law makes such self-dealing transactions
"improper" regardless of fairness, the charitable corporation would be
prohibited from indemnifying or reimbursing the director for any federal
excise tax personally incurred. However, if the director is successful in a
suit for self-dealing, the charitable corporation would be required to
indemnify him for defense expenditures. 82
B. 2002 Revised Model Business Corporation Act
As referenced in Part I, these generalized state law fiduciary duties are
closely aligned to those specified in the 2002 Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (2002 RMBCA). As with case law, the 2002 RMBCA
carefully differentiates between director standards of conduct and
standards of liability. 3 The board is charged with the responsibility to
manage the affairs of the corporation on behalf of the shareholders.8
4
78. Id. § 2.02(b)(5)(iv); see also id. §§ 8.31-33.
79. Id. § 8.51(a)(1)-(2).
80. Id. § 8.51(d)(2).
81. Id. § 8.52.
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2002) (standards of conduct), with id. §
8.31 (standards of liability).
84. Id. § 8.01(b).
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Generally, a director has a duty in discharging that responsibility to: (i)
act in good faith;8n and (ii) in the best interests of the corporation.
However, a director is only liable for any decision 7 provided that the
action: (i) was not protected from liability by the exculpation statute;8
and (ii) either the action was not in good faith,89 was not reasonably
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation,9 or the director
was not properly informed. 9,
The exculpation statute provides that an organization's articles of
incorporation "may" set forth a provision eliminating or limiting a
director's monetary liability damages for "any action taken, or any
failure to take action" except for: (i) an excess financial benefit;9 (ii) "an
intentional infliction of harm";93 (iii) liability for approving an unauthor-
ized distribution to shareholders;94 or (iv) "an intentional violation of
criminal law." 95 As discussed in Part III, bad faith would be included but
not subsumed by the exculpatory language excepting intentional harm.
However, the other bases for director liability could generally be
eliminated by the exculpation provision.96 Accordingly, the primary
reason for such a liability provision is to cover those situations in which
the corporation does not have a permissive exculpation statute in its
articles. But, as discussed extensively in Part III, because all director
liability can be eliminated by the exculpation statute except for specified
conduct, for-profit corporate liability has focused on the disqualification
under the exculpation exceptions.97
85. Id. § 8.30(a).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 8.31(a). Failure to take action would embrace abdication as a form of
inaction sufficient to impose liability.
88. Id. § 2.02(b)(4); see also id. § 8.31(a)(1).
89. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(i).
90. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(A).
91. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B).
92. Id. § 2.02(b)(4)(A).
93. Id. § 2.02(b)(4)(B).
94. Id. § 2.02(b)(4)(C); see also id. § 8.33.
95. Id. § 2.02(b)(4)(D).
96. See id. § 8.31(a)(2).
97. The focus of Part III is on Delaware law. The Delaware exculpation language is
somewhat different than the 2002 RMBCA if only because it collapses the "lack of good
faith" element with the intentional harm element. Compare id. § 8.31(a)(2)(i) (lack of
good faith) and id. § 2.02(b)(4)(B) (intentional harm), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7)(ii) (2001).
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C. 2008 Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
The 2008 changes to the 1987 RMNPCA (2008 MNPCA) 98 move away
from the 1987 RMNPCA and closer to the duty and liability model
presented in the 2002 RMBCA. A 2008 MNPCA nonprofit corporation
must have a board of directors99 that exercises all corporate powers.
Accordingly, corporate activities and affairs must be managed by or
under the direction of the board.'0'
Under the 2008 Act, as with a for profit corporation, the board of
directors must act in good faith and with a reasonable belief that the
action is in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation."'
Additionally, the board or a board committee must exercise an ordinary
person standard of care in becoming informed to make a decision or in
devoting attention to their oversight function.0 2 Also, a director must
disclose to the other board or committee members material information
not already known by those persons.0 3 However, disclosure is not
required where doing so would "violate a duty imposed by law, a legally
enforceable obligation of confidentiality, or a professional ethics rule."
'14
A director may rely on several sources to satisfy the duty of care. First,
the director may rely on employees "whom the director reasonably
believes to be reliable and competent in the functions performed or the
information, opinions, reports, or statements provided."' 5  Second, a
director may rely on other persons retained by the corporation 6
provided they normally handle matters involving expertise reasonably
believed within the person's competence.' Third, a director may rely on
a board committee provided the director is not a member and reasonably
98. The committee chair analyzes the 2007 RMNPCA Final Exposure Draft (recently
adopted as the 2008 MNPCA) in a recent law review article. See Lizabeth A. Moody,
Revising The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act: Plus qa Change, Plus C'est la Meme
Chose, 41 GA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2007) (noting the goals of the drafting committee in
revising the MNPCA). The article was part of a symposium on the topic titled
Symposium: State-Level Legal Reform of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, 41 GA. L.
REV. 1099 (2007).
99. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2008).
100. Id. § 8.01(b). However, the articles may include any provision not inconsistent
with law regarding managing the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation. Id.
§ 2.02(b)(6)(ii).
101. Id. § 8.30(a).
102. Id. § 8.30(b).
103. Id. § 8.30(c).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 8.30(f)(1).
106. Id. § 8.30(f)(2).
107. Id.
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believes the committee merits trust.' Finally, a director of a religious
corporation may rely on religious authorities such as ministers, priests,
and rabbis whose positions justify reliance and confidence.' °9
An important variation from the 1987 RMNPCA and the 2002
RMBCA is that director exculpation in a charitable corporation is now a
default rule rather than an optional provision invoked by the articles)'0
Pursuant to the default statute, a director is not liable to a nonprofit
corporation for any decision to act or refrain from acting."' A director
can avoid liability if the articles of incorporation state an exculpation
provision,"' the conflict of interest provisions are satisfied,"3 and the
taking of a business opportunity is appropriate. 4  In addition, the
director must have acted in bad faith to be liable."' A director may be
liable if not reasonably believing the action to be in the best interests of
the corporation," 6 or if not appropriately informed."7 The director must
also act with objectivity notwithstanding the familial, financial, or
business relationship with another person who has a material interest in
the conduct." 8 The objectivity must exist even if the relationship or lack
of independence could reasonably be expected to affect the director's
judgment regarding the conduct." 9 Additionally, a director may be liable
if it is reasonable to expect that this effect has been established and the
director cannot establish that he reasonably believed the challenged
conduct to be in the best interests of the corporation.2
As to abdication of duties, "a sustained failure of the director to
devote attention to ongoing oversight of the activities and affairs of the
corporation, or a failure to devote timely attention, by making .. .
appropriate inquiry," where a reasonably attentive director would
otherwise have done, will vitiate exculpation."' Finally, exculpation is
not available upon "receipt of a financial benefit to which the director
was not entitled or any other breach of the director's duties to deal fairly
108. Id. § 8.30(f)(3).
109. Id. § 8.30(f)(4).
110. See id. § 8.31(a).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 8.31(a)(1)(i); see also id. § 2.02(c).
113. Id. § 8.31(a)(1)(ii); see also id. § 8.60.
114. Id. § 8.31(a)(1)(iii); see also id. § 8.70.
115. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(i).
116. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(A).
117. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B).
118. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii).
119. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(A).
120. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B).
121. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iv).
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with the corporation and its members that is actionable under applicable
law."
122
Regarding indemnification for actionable conduct, the 2008 MNPCA
provides both a mandatory and a permissive rule. First, a nonprofit
corporation "must indemnify a director to the extent the director was
successful . . . in the defense of any proceeding.' ' 123 Also, a nonprofit
corporation "may" advance reasonable expenses before final disposition
of a proceeding, 124 if the director provides a good faith statement that the
standards of conduct have been satisfied, 12' as well as a promise to repay
funds advanced if the individual is ultimately not entitled to mandatory• r- - 126
indemnification. The promise must be an unlimited general unsecured
obligation accepted without reference to the financial ability to repay.121
A director may apply to the court for advancement where the court
determines that the director is entitled to: (i) mandatory indemnifica-
tion;128 (ii) indemnification or advance for expenses pursuant to an
authorized provision;2 . or (iii) indemnification is permissible because it is
"fair and reasonable" under all circumstances. "0 If the court determines
indemnification is appropriate under (i) or (ii), it may also order
reimbursement for reasonable expenses for seeking the indemnifica-
tion."' Finally, a nonprofit corporation may purchase insurance on
behalf of a director even if indemnification would not have been
appropriate.
1 2
D. ALl Principles of Nonprofit Governance
The American Law Institute 2007 Draft of the Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations (2007 ALI-PLNPO Draft) is more nuanced
than the 1987 RMNPCA, 2002 RMBCA, or 2008 MNPCA. Since the
2007 ALI-PLNPO Draft offers "governing principles" rather than a
model act intended for legislative enactment, it seeks to influence
attitudes and opinions rather than shape the precise contours of future
122. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(v).
123. Id. § 8.52.
124. Id. § 8.53(a).
125. Id. § 8.53(a)(1).
126. Id. § 8.53(a)(2).
127. Id. § 8.53(b).
128. Id. § 8.54(a)(1).
129. Id. § 8.54(a)(2).
130. Id. § 8.54(a)(3).
131. Id. § 8.54(b).
132. Id. § 8.57.
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legislation."' As such, it is far more specific regarding the nature, scope,
and immutability of charitable nonprofit corporation director fiduciary
duties to oversee management and the affairs of the charitable
enterprise. But, a basic premise remains throughout the materials: "if
you're on the board, you're on the hook."' Thus, under the 2007 ALI-
PLNPO Draft, substantial donors and advisors interested in the
charitable mission of a nonprofit direct their governance talents and
interests toward executive committees and advisory boards where insight
is valuable, but their duty and liability are reduced or nonexistent.
Before setting forth the contours of the fiduciary duties of charitable
board members, it is worth introducing special definitions discussed in
Part IV below, which examines the excise tax liability of private
foundation managers who "approve" acts of management self-dealing
and public charity organization managers who "approve" management
excess benefit transactions. A private foundation manager includes (i)
an officer, director, or trustee of a foundation (or similar individuals),135
and (ii) the employees of the foundation having authority or
responsibility to act. 136  A person is considered an officer if so
designated,137 or if regularly exercising authority to make administrative
or policy decisions on behalf of the foundation. But a person
possessing merely authority to recommend decisions, but not to
implement them without approval, is not an officer.'39 The term does not
include independent contractors such as attorneys, accountants, and
investment managers and advisors acting in those capacities.'40
Similarly, the term public charity "organization manager" includes any
officer, director, or trustee of such organization or similar individual.1
4'
A person is an officer if so designated in a constitutive document of the
142organization, or if that person regularly exercises general authority to• • 143
make policy decisions. But a person is not an officer if the person
merely has authority to recommend policy decisions, but not to
133. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS., at xxx-xxxi (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2007) (noting that the role of the ALI-PLNPO is to provide guidance to nonprofits,
regulators, and judges).
134. Id. § 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. I.R.C. § 4946(b)(1) (2000).
136. Id. § 4946(b)(2).
137. Treas. Reg. § 53.4946-1(f)(2)(i) (1972).
138. Id. § 53.4946-1(f)(2)(ii).
139. Id. § 53.4946-1(f)(2).
140. Id.
141. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2).
142. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(A).
143. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(B).
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implement them without approval of a superior. Examples include an
independent contractor such as an attorney or accountant.' 44 Under a
special rule, "[a]n individual who is not an officer, director, or trustee, yet
serves on a committee of the governing body of [a public charity] (or as a
designee of the governing body [so] described)," may nonetheless be
deemed an "organization manager."
1 45
The point is to make clear that the title of a person is not conclusive as
to whether such a person will be considered a foundation or organization
manager and therefore will be personally liable for excise taxes for
approving acts of management self-dealing or excess benefit transactions.
Moreover, knowing approval that will trigger the tax includes inaction
where the person is under a duty to act. 46 Therefore, simply not placing
a person on the board of directors does not solve the federal excise tax
exposure. Because the lack of standing generally precludes enforcement
of fiduciary duties, the federal excise tax prohibitions are effectively the
minimum standard for director behavior.
147
Under the 2007 ALI-PLNPO Draft, all charitable powers are exercised
by the governing board. 4' Accordingly, the governing board manages
the charity's activities and affairs. The governing board must therefore
ensure that it is responsible for the affairs of the charity. 50 Several
normative board functions are specifically listed"' including,
"establishing appropriate procedures for internal controls ... including
information flow to the board." '52 The board may delegate matters to
committees, officers, and executive staff but must retain ultimate
responsibility for the delegated matters. 153  However, in exercising
fiduciary responsibility for a delegated matter, a board member may rely
144. Id.
145. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(ii).
146. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(3).
147. See Hansmann, supra note 47, at 602-03.




151. Id. § 320(b).
152. Id. § 320(b)(8). This would include internal procedures for whistle blower disclo-
sures. Cf. Richard A. Wiley, Sarbanes Oxley: Does It Really Apply to Non-Profit and
Private Corporations?, BOSTON B. J. Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 10, 11-12 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1513(e) (Supp. V 2005)) (arguing that nonprofit corporations are subject to the SOX
criminal penalties for whistleblower retaliation, and suggesting that nonprofits adopt
internal policies designed to minimize the possibility of such penalties).
153. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 325(a).
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on experts and reports provided the member has no reason to know
reliance is unwarranted.- 4
Generally, each governing-board member must act in good faith to
fulfill the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.'55 The same duties of
loyalty and care apply regardless of whether a board member is
compensated or serves voluntarily.' 56  A person exercising board
authority, although not nominally on the board, is a fiduciary subject to
the duties of loyalty and care. 7 The concept of "good faith" is a
component of the duties of both loyalty and care and includes dishonest
and intentionally harmful conduct as well as conscious disregard of acting
in the charity's best interest (dereliction of duties or inattention) . 5
Good faith is particularly important because bad faith disarms all the
duty and liability protections enunciated in the governance principles.'59
When the organizational documents so provide, fiduciary duties may
be modified.I6 However, a modification may not unreasonably reduce
the duty of loyalty;161 "[r]educe the duty of care ... to permit a knowing
violation of law, intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or gross
negligence;' 6 1 or "[a]bsolve a fiduciary from the obligation to act in good
faith."'63
The duty of loyalty obligates "each governing-board member to act in
a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the charity, in light of its stated purposes."' 64 The duty of loyalty also
requires board members to act properly in connection with conflict of
interest transactions between the charity and fiduciaries.16 The duty of
care requires each board member "to become appropriately informed
about issues requiring consideration,... to devote appropriate attention
to oversight[,]. . . and to act with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably exercise in a like position and under similar
154. Id. § 325(b).
155. Id. § 300.
156. Id. § 300, cmt. (c)(2).
157. Id. § 300, cmt. (c)(3).
158. Id. § 300, cmt. (g)(1).
159. Id. This explains why the Disney litigation, discussed in Part III below, focused
on proof of bad faith. See infra Part III.F. Had bad faith been proven, the Disney board
would not have been entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule or statutory
exculpation from monetary liability.
160. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 305.
161. Id. § 305(a).
162. Id. § 305(b).
163. Id. § 305(c).
164. Id. § 310(a).
165. Id. § 310(b).
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circumstances."' 6 A governing board member who makes a business
decision in good faith still complies with the duty of care provided the
member (i) is not interested in the subject matter and can exercise
independent judgment,167  (ii) is reasonably informed under the
circumstances,' 6' and (iii) reasonably believes the action is in the charity's
best interests.
1 69
The board may approve a conflict-of-interest transaction between the
charity and a fiduciary or waive the charity's opportunity to participate in
a transaction between a fiduciary and another person provided the board
makes a good faith determination that the transaction is fair to and in the
best interests of the charity. 70 Generally, the determination must be
based on a disclosure of all material facts and the approval must occur
prior to the transaction.' 7' Regarding information flow, every board
member is entitled to receive information from management and to
inspect all books and records in exercising their fiduciary duties.72
Although confidentiality of such information must be preserved, it may
be disclosed in good faith to appropriate persons "to prevent, mitigate, or
remedy harm to the charity.' ' 73  Moreover, a board member has an
obligation to monitor the fiduciary duties of other directors and officers
174
and report suspected violations to the board as a whole. 75
In the case of a breach of a fiduciary duty by an officer or a board or
committee member, a court or regulatory authority should devise a
remedy based on the charity's best interests.176 Presumably, this would
include the IRS where an act of improper self-dealing or an excess
benefit transaction has occurred.77
Generally, "[a] member of the governing board, officer, or senior
executive is not personally financially liable for a claim based upon any
action taken or any failure to take action in the discharge of that person's
duties, except for unjust gain ... or injury to the charity.' ' 178 The unjust
gain or injury must generally arise from a conflict-of-interest
166. Id. § 315.
167. Id. § 365(a).
168. Id. § 365(b).
169. Id. § 365(c).
170. Id. § 330(b).
171. Id. § 330(c).
172. Id. § 340(a).
173. Id. § 340(b).
174. Id. § 350(a).
175. Id. § 350(b).
176. Id. § 360.
177. See id. § 360, cmt. d.
178. Id. § 370.
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transaction, 9 "an intentional breach of the duty of loyalty, or a breach of
the duty of care due to lack of good faith in acting or failing to act,"' or
"a knowing and culpable violation of criminal law,"'"' or "unlawful
distributions.""" The burden of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty or
the duty of care falls on the person challenging the conduct at issue.1
3
However, if the person proves a conflict-of-interest violation, the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the transaction was in the
best interests of the charity. s4  Unless immunity, indemnification, or
insurance is regulated by law or the charity's organizational documents,
decisions regarding the appropriate protection of fiduciaries are
governed by the general rules regarding the proper exercise of fiduciary
duties.'
E. Moral Norms
A rational question that must be considered in the context of nonprofit
governance requires understanding why and how the law affects the
behavior of those persons when the law imposes minimalist duties and
obligations that are rarely enforced. Several theories offer an
explanation. For example, if nonprofit corporate management and board
behavior is best explained by social psychology or some other social
phenomena, then laws designed to alter economic behavior will be less
effective. This means that non-legal norms can and do affect behavior
and help explain deviation from the adopted legal norm.
A legal positivist theory might suggest that the law is properly distinct
from morally mandated behavior.) 6 In this context, primary rules are
normative and govern behavior because they impose a standard but are
followed because of secondary rules that confer validity by public1 87
recognition. A legal naturalist theory might resist such a
179. Id. § 370(a).
180. Id. § 370(b).
181. Id. § 370(c).
182. Id. § 370(d).
183. Id. § 375(a).
184. Id. § 375(b).
185. Id. § 380.
186. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958). Hart rejected the natural law view and defended the
utilitarian/positivist view of Holmes, Austin, and Bentham that there should be a
separation between law and morals. Id. at 593-94. He argues that law is enforceable
because it is the law, not because it has a divine quality. Therefore, law has a utilitarian
aspect because it is a means to an end. See generally id.
187. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game Theory, Insurance and
Kant: Toward a Moral Theory of Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083, 1088
(2004).
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characterization of the law and suggest that a putative law must be
imbedded with some reasonable semblance of moral content to actually
become law.' A particularly significant approach to understanding the
effect of social norms is Eric Posner's model of non-legal cooperation,
which posits that "people engage in behavioral regularities in order to
show that they are desirable partners in cooperative endeavors," and the
resulting social norms "can vastly enhance or diminish social welfare."'8 9
In this context, governance laws serve to regulate the corporate
enterprise by establishing incentives and disincentives for various
corporate actors.' 9° The threat, fear, or avoidance of liability is not
always the most efficient regulator of human behavior. In many cases,
corporate actors are motivated by financial gain coupled with social non-
legal norms.'9' Whereas financial gain has received the most attention,
social norms are beginning to be studied and from various social norm
perspectives.'93 Professor Melvin Eisenberg studies norms in the context
of corporate law using the term "social norm" to mean "all rules and
regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and
organizational rules., 194  Legal rules are those adopted by the legal
system, and organizational rules are those adopted by private
organizations.'95  One type of social norm is an obligational norm
whereby actors consciously adhere to the norm even though it is not legal
188. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-31 (1967);
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 638-48 (1958).
189. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 4 (2000).
190. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1253 (1999).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1253-54 & n.2.
193. See, e.g., id. ("[T]his Article ... examines the interrelation of social norms and
corporate law."); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1698 (1996) ("This Article uses theories about the efficiency of the common
law and the efficiency of statutory law to shed light on the likelihood that norms are
inefficient."); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 765 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social
Norms in Politics and the Law] ("Symbols dominate American politics and permeate the
law, but they are poorly understood.... This article uses a signaling model to explain why
symbols matter."); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 135 (1996) ("[T]his
Article addresses two closely related descriptive questions. First, under what conditions
will nonlegal sanctions subvert legal rules and cause them to produce no effect or even the
opposite of the intended effect? Second, how can the state exploit the existence of
nonlegal sanctions in order to attain its goals most effectively?").
194. See Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 1255.
195. Id.
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in nature because deviation invites peer criticism. '9 Moral norms are
arguably the most important category of obligational norms, and
Professor Eisenberg argues that much human conduct can only be
explained on this basis. Indeed, the effect of social norms depends on
whether the norm is obligational and has been internalized by the
actor.197 It is tempting to respond to the moral obligational norms in
terms of an economic cost-benefit analysis with cost measured in terms of
guilt and benefit measured in terms of internal satisfaction from doing
the right thing. However, this may be inadequate because moral norms
naturally become part of one's moral character and are therefore often
unconscious, to a degree. There is no cost-benefit analysis. But this
analysis fails to consider psychological behavior motivated by
commitment and sympathy. The Aristotelian notion argues that one who
might die for friends or family does not do so out of satisfaction, because
he is risking "all prospect[s] of future satisfaction."' 98
When obligational and moral norms are not internalized however, they
will be adhered to only for instrumental reasons. The effect of such
norms in any particular environment will depend entirely on a
comparison between the immediate external gains of disobedience with
the long-term costs and benefits of disobedience, the latter including
reputational and esteem losses. Under game theory, disobedience signals
to the market that one is not a cooperator and thus costs that person the
voluntary cooperation of others. 99
III. FOR-PROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FROM THE DELAWARE
PERSPECTIVE °"
The discussion in Part II of for-profit and nonprofit corporate
governance standards presents an incomplete picture of management
and director fiduciary duties from a limited statutory perspective. While
there are precious few nonprofit governance cases, there is a rich but
tortured history of for-profit corporate governance standards and the
196. Id. at 1257.
197. See id.
198. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (1997).
199. See Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, supra
note 193, at 767-68.
200. Portions of Part III were previously published in Carter G. Bishop, Directorial
Abdication and the Taxonomic Role of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Law, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 905 and Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care
Liability in Business Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Bishop,
Good Faith Revival]. The author and the Catholic University Law Review have edited this
section since the prior publications.
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related fiduciary duties. This Part traces that governance history through
the Delaware lens because many, if not most, public corporations are
incorporated in Delaware. Accordingly, Delaware has developed the
most comprehensive pattern of the judicial contours and shaping of
common law fiduciary duties.
A. Core Director Fiduciary Duties: Loyalty, Care & The Business
Judgment Rule
Delaware director fiduciary duties are derived from a statutory
obligation to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.20' Thus,
Delaware law creates an obligation for directors to manage the business
affairs of a corporation on behalf of the shareholders. 2 2 The director-
shareholder relationship is therefore fiduciary in nature.0 3 Of course,
corporate officers are also agents and fiduciaries of the corporation, but
they are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the directors, who are
the direct link to the shareholders 4.2  Although the director-shareholder
relationship 2°s is statutory in origin, the nature and contours of a
201. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
202. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("A director is a fiduciary. So is
a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers
in trust. Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where
any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on
the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to
show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein. The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it
aside." (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)).
203. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949)
("A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another person.").
Fiduciary obligation originated in equity and arose from a relationship of "trust and
confidence," but the term "fiduciary" was adopted to apply to situations falling short of
trusts in which a person was nonetheless obligated to act like a trustee. Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880;
L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 71-72.
204. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601-02 (2005) ("[C]orporate officers are
fiduciaries because they are agents.").
205. Whether fiduciary duties are owed directly to shareholders alone or to the
corporation and the shareholders jointly is a matter of statutory language and common
law interpretation. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of
Limited Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 108-09 (2006). However, the
question has little significance beyond whether an injured shareholder has standing to
bring suit for an alleged violation of a fiduciary directly or must bring the action
derivatively and on behalf of the corporation. See id. at 88-89. The characterization is
important because, unlike a direct suit, a derivative suit is subject to a number of
procedural limitations, such as the demand requirement designed to protect the balance of
power between management and shareholders to decide who has the power to cause the
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206Delaware director's fiduciary duties are rooted in common law but are
derived from agency and trust law. 2°7 Because trust law assigns fiduciary
responsibilities to a person holding property on behalf of another,208 it is
logical that directorial fiduciary duties2 evolved from trust law, which
210was very well developed by the time corporate governance evolved.
However, trustee-styled duties are conservative in nature; they are
designed to preserve and protect the trust property on behalf of the trust
beneficiaries."' Thus, they are not well-suited to encourage
entrepreneurial expectations associated with directors attempting to
maximize shareholder returns.2 2
corporation to bring suit. Id. at 74-75. While a line of cases addresses the direct/derivative
distinction through the rights/duty question, those cases can be generally reconciled by
analyzing the question from the direct versus collective shareholder harm or injury
approach. See id. at 106-10, 123-34.
206. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment
Rule, 48 BUs. LAW. 1337, 1337-38 (1993).
207. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust
Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 651-52 (2002).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) ("A trust ... is a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."); id. § 3(3)
("The person holding property in trust is the trustee."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall
act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act.").
209. Interestingly, various laws define the following relationships differently with
different consequences based upon their nature: (i) trust and confidence; (ii) fiduciary; and
(iii) agency. For example, while all agents are fiduciaries and all fiduciaries are in a
relationship of trust and confidence, the converse is not true. Consequently, not all
fiduciaries are agents, and a person might well occupy a position of trust and confidence
and yet not be a fiduciary. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d)
(1981) (non-disclosure of a fact is equivalent to a positive assertion of that fact "where the
other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relationship of trust and
confidence"); id. § 169(a) (a person is ordinarily not entitled to rely on an assertion of a
mere opinion rather than fact unless that person stands in a relationship of trust and
confidence to the person offering the opinion); id. § 173 (a contract between a fiduciary
and beneficiary is voidable by the beneficiary unless it is on fair terms and the beneficiary
"consents with full understanding of [its] legal rights and of all relevant facts that the
fiduciary knows or should know").
210. See DeMott, supra note 203, at 880-81.
211. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 ("The trustee is under a
duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property.");
id. § 181 ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to
make the trust property productive.").
212. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 224
(2006); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 393-94 (3d
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B. Director Duty of Care & The Business Judgment Rule
Under Delaware corporate law, director duty of care claims were
arguably not fully embraced and articulated until 1963,213 when Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company determined that directors
owe "that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men
would use in similar circumstances. 2 14 Graham considered an allegedly
negligent director's failure to institute a system to detect and prevent
corporate harm resulting from illegal employee price fixing.215 Because
the directors had no actual or imputed notice of the illegal activity, the
Graham court concluded that the directors were not liable, even under
216the ordinary care standard.
Various other articulations of the duty of care 217 include a "subjective
element," requiring the director to act in a manner that he or she
personally but reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation. An "objective element" also exists, requiring one to act
"with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circum-
stances."
218
However articulated, an alleged breach of the ordinary negligence duty
of care is subject to the business judgment rule. 2" This generally means
that director liability will not be imposed absent gross negligence.2 2 ' The
ed. 2005) ("It soon became clear that saddling corporate directors with the kinds of
standards applicable to the guardians of trusts and eleemosynary institutions was
counterproductive. . . . Consequently, the courts began to develop a separate set of
principles for corporate management.").
213. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 982-83 (1994).
214. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). The court
relied upon a prior United States Supreme Court case, Briggs v. Spaulding. 141 U.S. 132,
152 (1891) (holding directors to the standard of care attributable to "ordinarily prudent
and diligent men").
215. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (2005) (providing that a director
must act (i) "in good faith," (ii) "in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation" (subjective), and (iii) "discharge [his] duties with the
care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe" to be in the best interests of
the corporation).
218. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (1992); see also Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-40 (1993).
219. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a).
220. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its
Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449,449-50 (2002).
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business judgment rule exists in several formulations, including both
statutory and common law forms.22' All forms absolve directors from
liability even when the ordinary duty of care may otherwise have been
breached.
In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the
Delaware version of the business judgment rule as follows:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion,
that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on
the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting
the presumption....
.. . [The business judgment rule] has no role where directors
have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act. But it also follows that under applicable
principles, a conscious decision to refrain from acting may
nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy
the protections of the rule."'
Importantly, the business judgment rule presumption is only available to
"disinterested" directors who "neither appear on both sides of a
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit," other
22than one that benefits all shareholders proportionately. In this context,
director self-interest may be overcome by disclosure of all material facts
and the approval by a disinterested majority of the remaining board
members.224
As articulated, the Delaware business judgment rule has two operative
effects-a procedural presumption that shields director decisions from
judicial review, and a substantive aspect that shields directors from
personal liability:
221. Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and
Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business
Organizations, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 345 (2005).
222. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted). Other formulations exist with slightly different language and effect. See, e.g.,
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (2005); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (providing that "[a] director or officer who makes a business
judgment in good faith fulfills the duty," provided that person (i) "is not interested ... in
the subject of the business judgment"; (ii) is properly informed; and (iii) "rationally
believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation"). The ALl
language creates a safe harbor rather than the presumptive approach of Delaware law.
223. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
224. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2001).
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"The rule operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and a
substantive rule of law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a
'presumption that in making a business decision, the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care],
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interest of the company.' The presumption initially
attaches to a director-approved transaction within a board's
conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evidence
of 'fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal
profit or betterment.'
225
The procedural aspect is mostly superficial in that the plaintiff already
has the burden of proof and can only satisfy that burden by proving gross
226negligence, causation, and damages.
On a far more serious level, the Aronson formulation of the rule has
been criticized as fundamentally flawed and overbroad.227  While not
challenging the procedural aspects of the Aronson formulation2  critics
argue that the substantive aspects needlessly conflated the "duty" of care
with the "liability" for breach of the duty. Specifically, the business
judgment rule arguably should not be regarded as a "generalized liability
shield," nor as a presumption that the duty of care was not breached, and
certainly not as a substantive standard for reviewing whether conduct
breached the duty of care in the first instance.22' Rather, the business
judgment rule is best understood merely as "a policy of judicial non-
review.,210
In this view, the business judgment rule blocks judicial review of the
quality of a business decision, regardless of whether or not ordinary care
was exercised.2 1' As such, a poor but nonetheless "rational" decision
should never be evidence of the failure to exercise due care. The
decision itself only becomes evidence of a lack of due care when it is not
even minimally rational. While it is common to characterize conduct as
12unreasonable, it is rare to characterize the same conduct as irrational.
225. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), modified on reh'g,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569
A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187
(Del. Super. Ct. 1988)).
226. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 206, at 1345.
227. See generally Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW.
625 (2000).
228. See id. at 628.
229. Id. at 628-31.
230. Id. at 631.
231. Id. at 632.
232. Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 443.
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Thus, cases involving liability for an erroneous decision will succeed only
when the decisions themselves cannot be rationally explained and the
directors fail to provide any rational reason for conduct, such as
developing a plant directors knew could not be operated profitably.23'
Liability does not attach merely by way of an unreasonable decision;
rather, the decision must be irrational. In all other cases of rational
decisions, the process of gathering information and making the decision
itself is the proper focus of the rule.
Because the substantive formulation of the business judgment rule is
overbroad, it may operate to subsume the duty of care. m This, in turn,
masks the proper inquiry into whether the duty of care itself has been
breached-a question quite separate and distinct from whether liability
should attach to that breach. Moreover, nightmarish distinctions are
required to apply the duty of care and the business judgment rule
together. In a 1993 case, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court noted that it had "consistently held that [a] breach of the
duty of care, without any requirement of proof of injury, is sufficient to
rebut the business judgment rule.'2 35 But how do you rebut the rule that
presumes that care was not breached?
2 36
The conflation of the duty of care into the business judgment rule has
had further troubling aspects. Most serious is that proof of a breach of
duty of care shifts the burden to the directors to prove the entire fairness
of the transaction.m Prior to the 1993 Cede case, the entire fairness
231
review was limited to cases involving a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Fortunately, the entire fairness standard was satisfied in the 1995 case
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. ,239 but the better reasoned approach
233. See, e.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634, 645 (Pa. 1966).
234. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care. Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 594 &
602-07 (1983).
235. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993), modified on reh'g,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
236. See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 787, 803-05 (1999) (discussing why director informedness is effectively the only
way to show a breach of the duty of care).
237. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 ("If the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant
directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the
'entire fairness' of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff."); see also Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) ("Where ... the presumption of the
business judgment rule has been rebutted, the board of directors' action is examined under
the entire fairness standard.").
238. See Bud Roth, Entire Fairness Review for a "Pure" Breach of the Duty of Care:
Sensible Approach or Technicolor Flop?, 3 DEL. L. REV. 145, 161 (2000).
239. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1179-80.
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would have been to keep the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish
a breach of duty of care, corporate harm, and causation. This was
Chancellor Allen's approach when Cinerama came before the Chancery
Court in 1991, where it was determined that the duty of care was
breached, but that the corporation was not harmed thereby.4 ° In any
event, Delaware statutory exculpation would cure most transactions,
even if not fair, as no liability would attach from even gross negligence.24'
The duty of care investigation extends much further than the decision
itself and incorporates the question of whether an unreasonable decision-
242making process was utilized to reach the decision . In these cases, even
a good decision might be preceded by a negligent or deficient process.
While a favorable outcome or good decision likely means the plaintiff
will not be able to prove the corporation suffered any harm, the analysis
under the duty of care is different than under the business judgment rule.
The duty of care also covers process failures such as inattention or
nonfeasance where no decision was made.24' Thus, the risk of an
overbroad business judgment rule is the conceptual failure to review
process independent of any actual decision. Where directors employ an
unreasonable process or unreasonably fail to employ a rational process
to carry out their duties to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, liability should attach under the duty of care. Liability is
independent of the quality of any decision provided only that the plaintiff
can establish corporate harm as a result and that the unreasonable
conduct was the cause of that harm.2"
Whatever else one might observe about the proper form and function
of the business judgment rule, there is little room for doubt that its
overall impact and effect have been some of the most important aspects
of fiduciary duty law. In Delaware in particular, the skilled application
of the rule allows the courts to police ridiculous behavior while shielding
unreasonable, but not irrational, behavior.2 45 The rule allows courts to
balance proper entrepreneurial risk-taking against aberrant behavior
240. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *18 (Del. Ch.
June 24, 1991), affd in part rev'd in part sub nom. Cede, 634 A.2d 345.
241. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (allowing a corporation to include
an exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorporation); see also E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance
From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399,
1428 (2005).
242. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 92 (2004) (discussing the duty of care challenge brought in Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
243. See id. at 93.
244. See Cinerama, 1991 WL 111134, at *18.
245. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 241, at 1442.
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without accountability. The ancient theory of the sound business rule
is most likely to prosper when managers are free to make decisions
unencumbered by judicial second-guessing regarding the wisdom of their
choices. 47
A famous example of the business judgment rule's application is
Shlensky v. Wrigley. In the 1960s, Wrigley Field, home of the Chicago
Cubs, remained the only major league stadium without lights and, thus,
could not hold night games. 4' The Cubs' board of directors decided not
to equip the stadium with lights. Shlensky voted the other way and then
challenged the board's action.2° The remaining directors denied that
their action was based on the mere preferences of Phillip Wrigley, the
president and majority shareholder. Rather, they asserted that they had
exercised sound business acumen because night games would negatively
affect the surrounding neighborhood.251 The court agreed, arguing that
absent fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest, it should not interfere with
board decisions. Indeed, the business judgment rule arguably extends
protection in the corporate context to those whose ordinary negligence
253might violate the duty of care and compel liability in other contexts.
Unfortunately, the business judgment rule has always been
affirmatively used to protect poor business decisions. When the conduct
does not result from a business decision, the application and policy of the
business judgment rule is less persuasive. An early case determined that
a director could be accountable for "general inattention" to directorial
246. See Bainbridge, supra note 242, at 129.
247. See C.G. Hintmann, Comment, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the Context
of Directorial Fiduciary Duties and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST. LOUiS
U. L.J. 571, 575 (2005).
248. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
249. Id. at 777.
250. Id. at 778.
251. See id. at 780.
252. Id.
253. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Whereas an automobile driver
who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely
be called upon to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in
judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will
rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation. Whatever the
terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers
simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business
decisions has been doctrinally labelled [sic] the business judgment rule." (citations
omitted)); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond "Unlimiting" Shareholder Liability:
Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 396-98 (2004)
(arguing that extending vicarious tort liability to senior corporate officers for enterprise
torts would promote diligence).
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responsibilities.2 While the director there was not liable for his negli-
gent conduct, as there was no provable harm to the corporation, 5' the
court nonetheless set the early stage for abdication or dereliction of duty
liability not being protected by the business judgment rule. The doctrine
thus established was that one serves as a mere figurehead at peril of
liability.256 The doctrine was later reinforced in a case involving a closely
held family corporation, Francis v. United Jersey Bank.257  There, the
owners of the corporation-a husband, wife, and their two sons-also
made up the board of directors. Following her husband's death, the
251defendant widow let her sons run the company. Ignoring prior
warnings from her husband, she neglected her directorial duties and
allowed her sons to run the company into bankruptcy.2 9 The bankruptcy
trustee sued her and her estate for a breach of fiduciary duties and
prevailed after showing that her neglect caused serious corporate harm.26
C. Pre-Stone Duty of Loyalty
Delaware corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty 61 to their
262shareholders. Corporate law loyalty discourse tends to be highly
contextual, condemning or approving particular behavior in moral
terms. 26  As a result, it is common to see disloyal conduct penalizedbecause of its context rather than in broader general terms.
254. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
255. Id. at 617-18.
256. Id. at 616.
257. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981).
258. Id. at 818-19.
259. Id. at 819.
260. Id. at 816, 829.
261. The classic duty of loyalty was articulated in a partnership context. See Meinhard
v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one
another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of
particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a
level higher than that trodden by the crowd." (citation omitted)).
262. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); E. Norman Veasey, The Defining
Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 397-98 (1997).
263. Some argue that fiduciary duty moral rhetoric has no purpose for economic
actors; rather, fiduciary duties are much like other contractual undertakings. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 427 (1993); see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
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Because this occurs frequently, cases must focus on the particular
circumstances of the personal benefit or self-interest in order to
distinguish loyalty cases from care cases. For example: (i) an allegation
that fails to assert directors' actions were the result of an improper
personal reason does not state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty;
26
1
(ii) the essence of a loyalty claim asserts that a director misused power
over corporate property to derive personal benefit;2 65 (iii) alleged
disclosure violations do not implicate loyalty absent a showing that the
directors received a personal benefit;26 and (iv) because care and loyalty
are distinct, liability depends on a breach of the duty of care, and not
loyalty or good faith, unless director self-motivations are present.
267
Consequently, there remains reasonable disagreement over whether
there are adequate measures to properly distinguish loyalty claims from
care claims.26 These are often contextual but nonetheless illustrate the
difficulty in easily categorizing a claim as dealing with purely care or
purely loyalty. Illustrations include: (i) mere absence of a conflict of
interest is not adequate to fulfill loyalty or distinguish it from care;269 (ii)
in a contest for corporate control, director duties are not easily
categorized as relating to care or loyalty;2 0 (iii) evidence of disloyalty
includes, but is not limited to, motives of entrenchment, fraud, abdication
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1990). Others
argue that while fiduciary relationships may and often do arise by contract, duties of that
special relationship, unlike strictly non-fiduciary contractual relationships, have a special
character defined more by private law norms. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 203, at 887
("[C]ontract law doctrines operate so differently from fiduciary obligation that to invoke
them, even vaguely,.., confuses the analysis. For starters, these creatures of contract law
are controlled by the parties' manifest intention; fiduciary obligation sometimes operates
precisely in opposition to intention as manifest in express agreements. The terms of an
express agreement are surely not irrelevant to the fiduciary obligation analysis, but once a
court concludes that a particular relationship has a fiduciary character, the parties'
manifest intention does not control their obligations to each other as dispositively as it
does under a contract analysis."); see also Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 622-24 (1997); Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 47-48 (2003).
264. In re Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611,618 (Del. Ch. 1999).
265. See Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1997 WL 349169, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 13,
1997).
266. See Frank v. Arnelle, No. 15642, 1998 WL 668649, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1998);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1996).
267. In re Lukens, Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731-32 (Del. Ch. 1999).
268. Johnson, supra note 263, at 34-36; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles
M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified
Standard (and the end of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW. 1593, 1625 (1994).
269. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
270. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995).
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of director duties, and the sale of votes;271 (iv) a breach of loyalty can be
unintended and can occur even when action is taken in good faith;2 11 (v)
loyalty is implicated when a director seeks to thwart the lawful action of
the company's shareholders;.. and (vi) acting on motivations other than
pecuniary gain can result in disloyalty, as can conscious disregard of
one's duties.274
As a result, breaches of oversight and disclosure duties are not clearly
identified as care violations because of the presence of actual or inferred
intent and motive: (i) abandoning oversight responsibility may constitute
either a care or loyalty violation;2 5 (ii) a reckless or intentional breach of
care in oversight can be construed as a breach of loyalty or good faith not
available for exculpation; 276 and (iii) a director's duty to abide by
disclosure requirements derives from the duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith. 77 At the very least, these examples illustrate that it is not always
easy to determine whether care or loyalty is invoked in an isolated
manner. Disloyal conduct may occur in good faith, and good faith
278permits self-interest. Before the exculpatory provision, these overlaps
were less important. Now that care is the isolated duty available for
exculpation, loyalty and good faith are more important.
The most widely articulated definition of the duty of loyalty in
Delaware corporate law is found in the early 1939 case, Guth v. Loft,
Inc.:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use
their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A
public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the
interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
271. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993).
272. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
273. See State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Systems, Corp., No. 17637, 2001 WL 32639,
at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5,2001).
274. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
275. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 368 (duty of care); infra notes 279-82 (duty of loyalty).
276. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809-11 (7th Cir.
2003); McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 2001).
277. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).
278. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
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corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his
skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to
219make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
This formulation of loyalty includes the negative duty to refrain from
harmful conduct but, more importantly, the positive duty to affirmatively
protect the interests of the corporation.2 While the duty to refrain from
harmful conduct has been referred to as one to avoid betrayal, the
affirmative duty is less understood. As a result, both courts and scholars
often refer to it as encompassed by the notion of positive devotion. '
In this sense, the duty of loyalty creates an obligation of devotion that
can be breached by abdication, including innocent dereliction of
oversight or disclosure. Failure to perform as required, without more
and without deliberate bad faith, can therefore constitute disloyal
conduct.2 82 Although Guth involved personal benefit in the form of a
corporate opportunity,2 3 that is not a requisite to a breach of the duty of
284loyalty. While a court may hesitate to attach liability to a mere disloyal
abdication unconnected to a personal benefit, that is a decidedly
different matter than whether the duty was breached in the first place.
Loyalty breaches can exist independent of corporate harm, and in such
cases, the claim is based upon disgorgement of the personal benefit.2 11 It
is not a defense that the corporation itself was not harmed.286
279. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
280. In an interesting twist, although directorial fiduciary duties (including loyalty)
evolved from trust law, but were eventually scaled back to account for directorial
entrepreneurial responsibilities, see supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text, some
advocate that trust law should likewise scale back the responsibility of the trustee to act
solely for the benefit of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 59, at 931-32; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) ("The trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary."). But see
sources cited supra note 60.
281. See Johnson, supra note 263, at 37-41.
282. See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
283. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 508, 510 (Del. 1939).
284. Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000).
285. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 ("If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his
duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself, the law charges the interest so
acquired with a trust for the benefit of the corporation, at its election, while it denies to
the betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity,
does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that,
for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing
from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.").
286. See id.
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In most cases, however, corporate harm exists as the basis of the
lawsuit for breach of the duty of loyalty. Many disloyal acts are
intentional and usually thought to include an element of bad faith. But
bad faith is not a prerequisite to disloyal behavior; a director may
disregard an unknown duty of oversight or disclosure with all good
intention and nevertheless cause great harm to the corporation. 7
Indifference to a director's duty to protect is adequate to breach the duty
of loyalty.28 This feature of the duty requires a review of the role and
scope of good faith.
D. The Van Gorkom Legacy & Statutory Exculpation
Perhaps more than any other case, Smith v. Van Gorkom289 fueled the
concern that the Delaware business judgment rule was not as protective
as predicted. The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held an extremely
competent board 29° liable for its uninformed decision to sell the company
291too cheaply. In the case, Jerome Van Gorkom, Trans Union's
chairman and CEO approaching retirement, personally negotiated the
sale of the company at fifty-five dollars per share to Jay Pritzker, "a
social acquaintance."29 Van Gorkom negotiated the price privately,
without the board's knowledge or participation. 293 The agreed price was
a substantial premium over Trans Union's stock price, which had ranged
from approximately twenty-five to thirty-nine dollars per share over the
294previous five years. Van Gorkom had based the price not on a
291valuation but on an internal feasibility study of a leveraged buy-out .
The agreement set forth a ninety-day "market test" to allow Trans Union
287. Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 581. There, the court found that corporate directors
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority stockholders by causing the
corporation to repurchase eighty-three percent of its outstanding shares from its two
largest shareholders, under circumstances that benefited no one except the corporation's
president. Id. at 560, 581. Two of the four directors who approved the repurchases were
held liable for rescissory damages even though the two were not unjustly enriched, had not
obtained a special benefit, and had not acted in bad faith or with intent to harm the
minority shareholders. The directors violated their duty of loyalty because they
subordinated the minority's interests to the conflicting interest of their selling stockholder
employer in exiting its investment. Id. at 581.
288. Id.; see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2001 WL 115340 at *21-22 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 7, 2001) (discussing Strassburger).
289. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
290. See id. at 894-95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 874, 893 (majority opinion).
292. Id. at 864-67.
293. Id. at 866-68.
294. Id. at 866 n.5.
295. See id. at 866.
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to test the price for other market offers, but serious restrictions existed
on Trans Union's ability to negotiate with other purchasers.9 The
agreement also required swift approval by the Trans Union board. 9,
Accordingly, the board approved the proposal on the basis of a twenty-
minute account of Van Gorkom's negotiations with Pritzker.298 Approval
came without review of the agreement itself, underlying financial data, or
any discussion with the company's investment advisers.!
A shareholder derivative action challenged the board's decision, and
the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the directors were grossly
negligent in breaching the duty of care because they had failed to
properly inform themselves before voting to approve the merger.3°° The
court further clarified that a failure to make an informed business
judgment violated the duty of care rather than the duty of loyalty.01 The
board was simply ill-prepared to determine the fairness of the merger
pricey. In so holding, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the
Chancery Court's opinion that the decision was protected by the business
judgment rule, even though there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith,
or self-dealing.3 3
Commentators largely criticized the Van Gorkom opinion for creating
board liability on the basis of the quality of its decision-making process
and, thus, largely eliminating the protection of the business judgment
rule.3° The corporate community reacted with shock, and Delaware
quickly enacted the exculpatory statute the following year.3 05  Nearly
every state quickly adopted a similar statute, and just as quickly, large
numbers of corporate charters were amended to enable the exculpatory
306
protection. Nonetheless, the decision and subsequent statutory
296. Id. at 868-70.
297. Id. at 867.
298. Id. at 868-69.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 863, 872-73.
301. Id. at 872-73.
302. Id. at 872-73, 881, 893.
303. Id. at 873, 893.
304. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1438 (1985); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUs. LAW. 1187, 1188-90 (1986). But see
Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1985).
305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith,
State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1142-44 (2006).
306. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 331-33 & nn.92-93 (2004);
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exculpation arguably increased the formalism of board decision-making
without improving the quality of the decisions.30 7
Delaware's exculpation statute allows the articles of incorporation to
provide ex ante monetary liability exculpation to directors, provided the
conduct at issue did not involve: (i) "any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty;" (ii) "acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;" (iii) payment of
unlawful dividends; or (iv) "any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit."3°8  Because none of the
exceptions relate to the duty of care, the statute, by design, immunizes
Delaware directors from monetary damages when plaintiffs allege a
breach of the duty of care. What remains after exculpation? Those
seeking to impose liability upon corporate directors must assert one of
the exceptions to statutory exculpation.309 Director liability remains for
breaches of loyalty as well as for acts or omissions not in good faith.
Given the obvious importance of claims sounding in loyalty rather than
care, how does one characterize director behavior as one or the other?
E. Cede's Triadic Addition of Independent Good Faith
A modern understanding of Delaware director fiduciary duties
normally begins with the Delaware Supreme Court's view in the 1993
Cede case (discussed before) that collectively treated good faith, loyalty,
and due care as the "triads" of fiduciary duty.310 The Delaware courts
had previously determined that the "fiduciary duty of disclosure . . . is
not an independent dut[y]" but rather a part of good faith, loyalty, and
care.3 11  The Cede triadic formulation was repeated in Cinerama in
James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209-11 (1988).
307. See Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 589, 628-30 (2006).
308. § 102(b)(7); see also Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to
Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 375, 380-81 (1988).
309. In re Lukens, Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also
Johnson, supra note 263, at 31-32.
310. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified on reh'g,
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
311. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001); see also Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) ("[IJt is more appropriate... to speak of a duty of disclosure
[that is subsumed in the traditional duties] rather than the unhelpful terminology that has
crept into Delaware court decisions as a 'duty of candor."'). See generally Hamermesh,
supra note 266 (discussing the history and development of the director's duty of disclosure
to stockholders).
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1995, 3'2 Malone in 1998,3'3 and Emerald Partners in 2001,3'4 and has been
repeatedly used in Delaware case law since 1993.315 In many areas of the
law, standards of conduct and standards of liability are the same, but not
so in corporate fiduciary duty law."' Mostly, the corporate law
divergence between conduct and liability standards can be justified
because, unlike in other areas of law where conduct alone is involved,
corporate law must balance desirable conduct with the fact that directors
are required317 to make complex decisions in which the outcomes are
inherently risky."" Linked conduct and decision rules are therefore
necessary to encourage and tolerate ex ante decisions that might have
been decided otherwise if made with ex post hindsight.3"9 Unfortunately,
because loyalty, care, and good faith are not uniformly triadic, divergent
corporate law standards must account for varying policies that do not
easily co-exist in one formulation. This has led to intolerable confusion
and incoherence. °
While good faith has a long history in Delaware corporate law,321 its
prominence has recently taken center stage as shareholders struggle to
hold directors accountable for alleged corporate harm not involving
personal benefit or conflict-of-interest transactions.32 ' The absence of
312. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164, 1179 (Del. 1995).
313. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
314. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001).
315. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 12 & n.23 (2006) ("One commentator counted more than a dozen Delaware
cases decided by mid-2002 that adopted the triadic formulation of the duties of corporate
managers." (citing Charles Hansen, Sowing the Seeds of Confusion: The Ephemeral Triad,
73 ASPEN L. & Bus. CORP. 1, 2 (2002))).
316. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L.
859, 867-68 (2001); Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 437-38; see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 220, at 450.
317. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation.").
318. See Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 462, 464-67.
319. See id.; cf Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625, 630-36 (1984) ("[Tlhe possibility that
conduct or decision rules may have unintended side effects creates the potential for
conflict between decision rules and conduct rules in the absence of acoustic separation. A
decision rule conflicts with a conduct rule if the decision rule conveys, as a side effect, a
normative message that opposes or detracts from the power of the conduct rule.").
320. See Johnson, supra note 236, at 788-90; Johnson, supra note 227, at 626-28; see
also Johnson, supra note 263, at 30-33.
321. E.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo,supra note 241, at 1439, 1442.
322. See, e.g., id. at 1439-41.
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personal benefit excludes the harm from claims for breach of loyalty
under a narrow conception of loyalty that does not include the positive
element of devotion' 3 This legal posture directs litigants to a claim for
breach of the duty of care, which is protected by a robust business
judgment rule that presumes good faith and otherwise requires a showing
of gross negligence.324 Moreover, even gross negligence is protected by
statutory exculpation, as long as the director acted in good faith.3  Good
faith is thus the Achilles' heel of both the business judgment rule and
statutory exculpation. Some corporate law statutes positively require
326directors to act in good faith. Requiring good faith is an overt attempt
to characterize the director's conduct in a way to ensure statutory
exculpation.
Delaware further conditions permissive indemnification on good faith
conduct.3 27 It also excuses director liability for self-interested transac-
tions if the transaction is approved by disinterested directors acting in
good faith.3'2 As a consequence, even though no Delaware case has
determined that a director is liable for violating the duty of good faith, no
one can deny the importance of the directors acting in good faith.129 At
the very least, bad faith conduct: (i) will not qualify for statutory
exculpation, even if not disloyal;330 (ii) will not qualify for permissive
indemnification;33' and (iii) will not qualify for protection under the
business judgment rule.332 Given the considerable judicial and statutory
presence of good faith, scholarly commentary on the role and definition
of good faith in relation to corporate fiduciary duties has been
extensive.333
323. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
326. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§
8.30 (director good faith), 8.42 (officer good faith) (2005).
327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (2001).
328. Id. § 144(a)(1).
329. See Eisenberg, supra note 315, at 6-12.
330. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii).
331. See id. § 145(a)-(b).
332. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
333. See generally, Bishop, Good Faith Revival, supra note 200; Deborah A. DeMott,
Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context, 25 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 15 (1990); Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith,
Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995); Tara L. Dunn, The
Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready to
Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
531 (2005); Eisenberg, supra note 315; Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A
Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); John L. Reed
& Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the
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F. Disney & Stone Legacy
The recent series of events involving the Walt Disney Company
litigation is an excellent example of this tension between the Cede triadic
formulation of fiduciary duties and the Delaware exculpation statutory
language.'34 The Disney litigation began as a shareholder derivative
demand case, where no pre-suit demand by shareholders was made on
directors alleging misconduct by the Disney Board in connection with the
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz. 35 Specifically, the complaint
alleged that the Board breached its general fiduciary duties and duty of
nondisclosure claims in approving a lucrative employment contract for
the new president, Michael Ovitz, and then, fourteen months later, in
approving a $140 million payout under a "no fault" termination clause in
336Ovitz's employment contract. The Chancery Court granted a motion
to dismiss the fiduciary duty and waste claims against the Board for the
failure to make a pre-suit demand "or to allege particularized facts that
excuse such demand., 37 The court also granted a motion to dismiss the
disclosure claim for failure to state a proper claim.338 Reviewing the case
de novo, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed most of the dismissals
with prejudice, except that the fiduciary duty and waste claim dismissals
were affirmed without prejudice. This allowed the plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint on remand to the Chancery Court.339 On remand,
following a denial of a new motion to dismiss the amended complaint
34°
Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of
Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David
Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A
Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's
Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004); Matthew R. Berry, Comment, Does
Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors from Personal Liability? Only if
Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004); Jaclyn J. Janssen,
Note, In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders Should Not
Put Too Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability, 2004
WIs. L. REV. 1573; Thomas Rivers, Note, How To Be Good: The Emphasis on Corporate
Directors' Good Faith in the Post-Enron Era, 58 VAND. L. REV. 631 (2005); Karolyn
Knaack Steves, Note, Directors' Duty to Protect the Corporation from Harm: Good Faith
in Board Oversight After Caremark, 35 TEX. J. Bus. L. 32 (1998).
334. See generally Robert Baker, In re Walt Disney: What It Means to the Definition of
Good Faith, Exculpatory Clauses, and the Nature of Executive Compensation, 4 FLA. ST.
U. Bus. REV. 261 (2005); Dunn, supra note 333; Janssen, supra note 333.
335. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 351 (Del. Ch. 1998), affid in
part, rev'd in part sub. nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
336. Id. at 350-53.
337. Id. at 364-65.
338. Id. at 377-79.
339. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254, 267.
340. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275,279, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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and following a successful motion to exclude expert testimony on the
341
basis that it was directed to Delaware law and not the facts of the case,
342
the case was finally tried on its merits.
In evaluating the fiduciary duty claims, Chancellor Chandler first
determined that a breach of loyalty was not implicated by the facts. The
court explained that "[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted
to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests 343 that are "not shared by the stockholders generally. 3"'
Rather, "the duty of loyalty ... mandates that the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders take[] precedence over any [personal]
interest[s]" of the officers or directors; thus, it does not provide any safe
harbor for divided loyalty.345 Unfortunately, the court proceeded to
define loyalty narrowly: it is classically implicated by the receipt of "a
personal benefit not shared by all shareholders" or when a director or
officer is standing "on both sides of a transaction.' ' 46  The court
determined that Ovitz did not breach his duty of loyalty as a director or
officer by accepting the termination payment. He played no part in the
decision-making process to be terminated, he was entitled to the
payment under the terms of his contract, and an ordinarily prudent
person would not call for further inquiry. No other director breached a
duty of loyalty because there was no allegation of personal benefit or
conflict of interest.
The court also determined that no board member violated the duty of
good faith.348 Acknowledging that the Delaware courts have not been
clear as to whether good faith is a separate actionable duty, the court
defined good faith by the absence of bad faith.14' Further, bad faith was
described as "authorizing a transaction 'for some purpose other than [the
best interests of the corporation] or [when the transaction] is known to
constitute a violation of ... law."'35 This means that any "[a]ction taken
341. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2004 WL 550750, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 9, 2004).
342. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff'd, Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006).
343. Id. at 750 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
344. Id. at 751 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993)).
345. Id. (quoting Cede, 634 A.2d at 361) (second alteration in original).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 757-58.
348. Id. at 760.
349. See id. at 753-54.
350. Id. at 753 (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1996)) (second alteration in original).
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... to harm the corporation is a disloyal act in bad faith," and the reason
why the director so acted is irrelevant. 5' As such, a claim of bad faith
may include evidence that a director intentionally placed his own
interests before the best interests of the company and may include a
"systematic or sustained shirking of duty.""35  Because the business
judgment rule presumes good faith, a shareholder must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the director acted in bad faith.353 The
court found that the directors "did not act in bad faith, and were at most
ordinarily negligent, in connection with the hiring of Ovitz and the
approval of the [contract of employment]." 354 Because the Board
exercised business judgment, "ordinary negligence [was] insufficient to
constitute a violation of the fiduciary duty of care." '355
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court
and determined that the directors were not liable.356  In so doing, the
351. Id. at 753-54; see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)
("The reason for the disloyalty ... is irrelevant, the underlying motive . . . for conscious
action not in the corporation's best interest does not make it faithful, as opposed to
faithless."), quoted in In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 754 n.453; Nagy v. Bistricer, 770
A.2d 43, 48-49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("If it is useful at all as an independent concept, the
good faith iteration's utility may rest in its constant reminder . . . that, regardless of his
motive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its
stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he
causes."), quoted in In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 754 n.453.
352. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 754.
353. Id. at 755. The same complaint in this case survived a motion to dismiss because
the pleadings "alleged that Disney's directors 'consciously and intentionally disregarded
their responsibilities, adopting a "we don't care about the risks" attitude concerning a
material corporate decision."' Id. at 754-55 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003)). But the evidence did not prove the allegation.
Id. at 779.
354. Id. at 760.
355. Id. In the discussion of the business judgment rule, the court stated that "the
appropriate standard for determining liability [in cases of director inaction] is widely
believed to be gross negligence." Id. at 748. However, the court noted that, in one such
Delaware case, ordinary negligence was applied as the standard because the business
judgment rule does not apply in cases of inaction. Id. This occurs where the Board makes
no decision whatsoever. Id. at 748 & n.418 (citing Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp.,
1987 WL 28436, at *1-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987)). The same principle would apply when
bad faith blocks reliance on the business judgment rule. See id. at 750.
356. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d. 27 (Del.
2006). The court stated that:
It is notable that the appellants do not contend that the Disney defendants are
directly liable as a consequence of those fiduciary duty breaches. Rather,
appellants' core argument is indirect, i.e., that those breaches of fiduciary duty
deprive the Disney defendants of the protection of business judgment review,
and require them to shoulder the burden of establishing that their acts were
entirely fair to Disney.
Id. at 46.
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court developed the conceptual range of good faith in some detail by
delineating three categories of fiduciary behavior often considered as bad
faith: (i) "subjective bad faith" whereby a fiduciary actually intends to
harm the corporation (category I); (ii) gross negligence with no malicious
intent (category II); and (iii) conscious and intentional dereliction or
disregard of known duties (category III).117 The court dealt with each
category separately.358
The shareholders argued that category II, "care" bad faith, existed in
this case because the Disney directors were grossly negligent.359 Even
though the Chancery Court properly determined that gross negligence
did not exist, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the appropriateness
of treating mere gross negligence as bad faith. The court refused to
conflate or infer bad faith from mere gross negligence (including the
failure to be properly informed).36° The court justified its refusal by its
interpretation of two Delaware statutes that retain a separate and
distinct role for both gross negligence and good faith. Therefore,
conflation would specifically contravene statutory intent by making the
distinctions meaningless.361 First, the exculpatory provisions of Delaware
corporate law specifically permit, by way of a failure to make an express
exception, exculpation for a breach of the duty of care.362 The statute was
adopted to permit exculpation of even grossly negligent conduct.363 At
the same time, one of the four express exceptions to permissive
exculpation preserves liability for acts or omissions not made in good
faith. Thus, as the argument goes, conflation ignores the reality that the
statute requires retaining the distinction.364  Bad faith may not be
exculpated, but gross negligence may be exculpated. This disregards the
difficult task of defining the boundary between the two.
365
A second Delaware statutory pattern further requires separation of
gross negligence and good faith. Delaware corporate law provides for
permissive indemnification of any former or current officer, director,
employee, or agent against all expenses, including judgments resulting
from an unsuccessful defense, provided the person acted in good faith.
66
357. Id. at 64, 66.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 64.
360. Id. at 64-65 & n.104.
361. Id. at 65-66.
362. See id. at 65 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001)).
363. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 212, at 231-33; see also Bruner, supra note
305, at 1143-47.
364. See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 65.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 65-66 (citing tit. 8, § 145).
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Accordingly, a person who acted in good faith but with gross negligence
could be indemnified, whereas a person acting in bad faith could not. As
a result, conflation of gross negligence and bad faith frustrates a
Delaware statute suggesting the concepts are distinct.367
The problem with this second statutory approach is that at least the
exculpation statute is a modern innovation and is predicated upon
distinctions in common law, including a manageable definition of good
faith. It does little good after the statute is enacted to mandate the
separateness of good faith because it is in the statute, at least when the
statute was predicated on common law in the first place. Few argue that
good faith does not have an independent role in corporate law.3'6 That
question can be directed by statutory reference but, absent a statutory
definition, common law must supply the answer to that puzzle.
Category III, "loyalty" bad faith, includes conscious abdication of a
known duty. The Delaware Supreme Court determined that this
category is important and independent in order to catch conduct in
between subjective bad faith and gross negligence. 6' First, the court
determined that if disloyalty is classically defined to include the presence
of personal benefit or a clear conflict of interest, it would naturally
exclude the positive notion of devotion; therefore, good faith is necessary
to fill that void.37 ° Secondly, and again relying on Delaware statutory use
of the good faith concept, the court explained that it must remain a
distinct duty precisely because the exculpatory statute assigns it an
independent role.' Specifically, through the use of the conjunctive "or,"
the Delaware exculpation statute distinguishes good faith from
"'intentional misconduct' and a 'knowing violation of law."'
372
Characterizing the latter two concepts as forms of category I, "subjective
bad faith," and assuming an independent function of good faith separate
from intentional misconduct (not exculpated) and gross negligence
(exculpated), it follows that unintentional but nonetheless culpable bad
faith must exist. In short, statutory exculpation exists for gross
negligence but not for knowing conduct or inferred conduct that is
367. Id. at 66.
368. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 212, at 213.
369. See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 66.
370. Id. at 66-67. Chancellor Chandler determined that an expanded version of loyalty
embracing elements of positive devotion could fill the gap currently filled by good faith.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd,
Brehm, 906 A.2d. 27 (citing Johnson, supra note 263).
371. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 67 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii)(2001)).
372. See id.
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between gross negligence and intentional misconduct. This could
certainly include serious abdication or dereliction failures.373
None of these categories is particularly helpful. First, except for cases
involving provable subjective bad faith (the "smoking gun"
memorandum), proof of such behavior is quite difficult, particularly
when there are objective justifications for the behavior. Secondly,
measures framed in terms of exceeding gross negligence, but less than
intentional negligence, are not particularly useful, either. Gross
negligence itself is an elusive concept. To suggest that unintentional bad
faith must be worse than gross negligence is not a helpful standard.
A more plausible role for good faith would be to make it not an
actionable independent standard, but to relegate it to a status that simply
defeats the privilege of asserting various statutory and judicial referents
that work to shield behavior from liability. The net effect would then be
to eliminate the business judgment rule presumption, eliminate statutory
exculpation, and eliminate permissive indemnification. This alone does
not create liability. As evidenced by the Delaware Supreme Court,
pleading bad faith to deconstruct the business judgment rule is not
adequate to create liability if the directors can prove entire fairness.
3 74
More is needed. Absent a claim of personal benefit, liability will follow
only upon a showing of breach of duty, corporate harm, and causation.
Without a showing of personal benefit, the breach is more likely to be
defined in terms of the duty of care. However, bad faith eliminates
reliance upon both the business judgment presumption, as well as
statutory exculpation. Once these protections are stripped away by bad
faith, the standard of care should be ordinary care. The Chancery Court
determined that, at most, the directors exhibited ordinary negligence, but
because the business judgment rule presumes good faith and that
presumption was not rebutted in this case, ordinary negligence was not
adequate to create liability.375 If the business judgment rule had not
applied because no decision had been made, what standard would apply?
Gross negligence can hardly be the standard because the business
376judgment rule does protect gross negligence.
Although the presence of a decision makes proving bad faith more
problematic, because the business judgment rule presumes good faith,
bad faith should have no role beyond determining the appropriate
liability standard-ordinary negligence. If bad faith is present, neither
373. Id. at 66-67.
374. Id. at 46.
375. See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 760.
376. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
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the business judgment rule nor statutory exculpation is available. Is the
bad faith itself, then, independently actionable as a positive duty? If so,
is it strict liability or is there a separate duty? Treating bad faith as a
method to disarm statutory and judicial favoritism toward directors
seems appropriate, as no policy can be advanced to justify presumptions
and exoneration for intentional or near intentional bad behavior.
Stripping away this favoritism, then, leaves a base duty of ordinary care,
with a showing of breach, harm, and causation shifting the burden to the
directors to establish that the transaction or conduct nonetheless did not
378impede an otherwise fair result to the corporation. Fairness is not a
correct defense at this instance; one hopes that, in an appropriate case,
the Delaware courts will strike the Cede analysis that applies entire
fairness to a duty-of-care breach.379 Indeed, this explains the curious
passage of the employment contract and the approach of the
shareholders in Disney-or at least the plaintiff's confusion over their
behavior.
Disney did not consider a direct case of directorial abdication of duty
or failure to act. Although certain aspects of the case could have
permitted such an argument, the case was instead couched in terms of
bad faith tacit approval of exorbitant compensation. So, after Disney,
the question remained how the newly defined concept of bad faith would
apply in the context of a pure abdication of duty case.3 O It did not take
long for an answer to arrive. In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme
Court clarified that the Disney categories of bad faith were not an
independent basis of liability but rather a component of the duty of
loyalty.381
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the Chancery Court had
classified Stone as a "classic Caremark claim."3 The facts were relatively
simple. AmSouth Bancorporation branch bank employees failed to file
"Suspicious Activity Reports" as required by federal law."" As a result,
377. See supra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
378. See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 747 (The business judgment rule "can be
rebutted by a showing that the board violated one of its fiduciary duties in connection with
the challenged transaction. In that event, the burden shifts to the director defendants to
demonstrate that the challenged transaction was 'entirely fair' to the corporation and its
shareholders." (footnote omitted)).
379. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 351 (Del. 1993).
380. See generally In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (establishing the standard for liability in director abdication cases).
381. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
382. Id. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Chancery Court decision was
not reported. Stone v. Ritter, No. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006).
383. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
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in 2004, AmSouth paid $40 million in fines and $10 million in civil
penalties to settle investigations into those failures.384  No fines or- 385
penalties were imposed on the directors.
AmSouth shareholders William and Sandra Stone brought a derivative
suit action against current and former AmSouth directors without
making a pre-suit demand.3" They alleged that the directors failed to
implement reasonable and proper compliance and reporting system
procedures to detect and ensure there would be no violations of the
387
federal Bank Secrecy Act.
The Chancery Court dismissed the complaint for failing to plead facts
with requisite particularity to excuse making a demand on the directors
to bring the action before bringing a derivative action.3 In affirming, the
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that a critical component of pre-
suit demand excusal is whether the alleged directorial conduct can be
exculpated under Delaware's exculpation statute."' Exculpation excuses
monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for bad faith
conduct or a breach of the duty of loyalty.39° In discussing director
liability in the Caremark line of abdication cases, the Delaware Supreme
Court made clear that to act in good faith does not require directors to
"'possess detailed information about all aspects of the operation of the
enterprise."'3 91  Rather, liability predicated on ignorance of liability-
creating corporate activities will only exist where there is a "'sustained or
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists."'3 92
Importantly, directorial oversight liability depends upon the failure of
a director to act in good faith.393 Citing the Disney bad faith categories,
the court referenced a need to establish that a director intentionally fails
to act despite a duty to act, thus indicating a conscious disregard for
directorial duties.394 More importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 364.
387. See id. at 364, 366.
388. Stone v. Ritter, No. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006).
389. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
390. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367.
391. Id. at 368 (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
392. Id. at 369 (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971).
393. See id.
394. Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d.
27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
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indicated that a director who fails to act in good faith may incur liability
because good faith is a "subsidiary element" of the duty of loyalty.
3
9
This means bad faith oversight liability is a part of the duty of loyalty.
3
6
Somewhat astonishingly, the Court thereby characterized Caremark
oversight liability as a duty of loyalty species rather than a duty of care
species even though Caremark itself suggests it is a duty of care case.",
In any event, Stone clearly collapses the "triad" of fiduciary duties by
subsuming good faith into the duty of loyalty and eliminating it as an
independent basis of liability.3" At the same time, Stone appropriately
expands loyalty cases in Delaware corporate law by eliminating the
requirement that a financial interest be involved for director conduct to
violate the duty of loyalty. 9 Consequently, a systematic oversight failure
can result in a duty of loyalty breach through the lens of bad faith even
when the directors failed to profit financially from the oversight failure.
Even after this expansion, however, a Caremark bad faith loyalty
oversight failure claim is still "'possibly the most difficult theory"' under
which to obtain a judgment against directors.4°0
G. The Future of Shareholder Trust & Control
The gap between shareholder expectations of directorial control over
management excess and abuse has created a serious4° trust gap in
395. Id. at 369-70 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
396. Id.
397. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960, 967. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell, Essay: Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty (Univ. of Minn.
Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-35, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008930 ("In this essay, we argue that the court in Stone v.
Ritter got it right, and indeed, should have gone further. Stone v. Ritter recasts Caremark-
type 'care' as a species of the duty of loyalty; we think the duty of care more generally is
properly understood as largely subsumed by the duty of loyalty."); Justin Nemunaitis, On
Good Faith and the Future of Scienter in Delaware Corporate Law (Mar. 28, 2008)
(unpublished note, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114347) (stating that the most
important element of the Disney and Stone conception of good faith is scienter, and
arguing that "[b]y emphasizing scienter, the Delaware Supreme Court has undermined the
rationale for many of its longstanding decisions" regarding corporate fiduciary duties).
398. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 372 (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967).
401. Cf Bernard Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using
Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131-36 (2001) (noting the lack of Russian
corporate governance norms and using data from Russian corporations, which indicates
their governance behavior affects their market value, to suggest that governance norms do
matter even though true empirical data in the United States is lacking); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2151 (2001)
("[C]orporate behavior may be more shaped ... by social norms than by legal rules.");
Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2001)
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corporate America.40 This Part has examined various initiatives to
control abusive corporate management behavior.4°0 Sarbanes-Oxley
attempted to shape lawful behavior by imposing various constraints upon
the conduct of critical managers °. 4  Delaware adopted a different and
arguably more effective approach0 5  The expansion of loyalty to
encompass a positive duty of devotion to corporate governance matters
is far less easily avoided than specific negative controls. 6 Collapsing
(arguing that while norms are important, "incorporating them into the theory of the firm
has been very difficult." Norm is defined as "a rule that is neither promulgated by an
official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal
sanctions, yet is regularly complied with") (quoting Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and
the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365-69 (1997)).
402. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43
DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) (arguing that trust is essential to corporate relationships); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 614-17 (2001)
(discussing the importance of trust in fiduciary relationships). Cf Robert Cooter &
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717
(2001) (explaining how firm-specific fairness norms promote efficiency by encouraging
trust and loyalty); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006) (suggesting that corporate governance scholarship is essentially
secular, while society remains essentially religious). It is simple to suggest that
shareholders simply "vote" by selling their shares and move fluidly from one liquid
investment to the other, but this remedy is inadequate. Voting by selling shares retains a
component of the lack of trust in the marketplace itself by moving liquidity from less risky
investments to more risky investments. Moreover, there is a time lag between the
discovery and reporting of mistrust in the market and the timing of shareholder
investment. By the time the bad news is disclosed, the shareholder has already suffered
the loss, and the liquidity movement simply locks in the distrust.
403. See discussion supra Parts 1-III. Director compensation remains relatively small
and, hence, not a factor in the equation. See generally SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 2005
TRENDS IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES OF THE 100 LARGEST US
PUBLIC COMPANIES 6 (2005) available at http://www.shearman.com/cg-survey05/ (follow
"View Full Text" hyperlink for .pdf document) (noting that director compensation levels
have increased in recent years, but that many top-100 corporations still report director
compensation in the $40,000 annual range). For an interesting analysis arguing that
employee stock options create a norm in favor of non-conflicting fortunes within the
financial community of a company, see Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and
Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (2001).
404. See discussion supra Part I; see also, Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1149-50
(2004).
405. See discussion supra Part III; cf Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
553, 554-56 (2001) (arguing that mandatory rules designed to increase trust have precisely
the opposite effect when the rule is used opportunistically simply to avoid penalized
behavior without engaging in trustworthy behavior).
406. For example, serving passively on several boards for aggregate larger returns is a
rather simple target for abdication claims. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some
Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS.
LAW. 1371, 1395 (2002), quoted in Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical
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good faith into actionable loyalty thus at once serves the function of
making the duty, breach, and liability more intuitive, while also making
the fact of liability infinitely more flexible to fit the design of the
Delaware courts. By imposing a positive duty of devotion upon
directors, expanded loyalty fills the gap left by the more amorphous
concept of bad faith.47 Although the Delaware Supreme Court made
abundantly clear that isolated instances of oversight failure will not be
actionable, it did not define the precise contours of when oversight
failure is systematic and actionable. This way, directors are encouraged
to take affirmative steps to be more involved in management oversight.4
While it is impossible to quantify the precise market effect of this
expansion of loyalty, that very lack of precise predictability discourages
actionable managerial behavior.
This expansion is only effective provided it restores and maintains
investor trust in corporate management and the marketplace.49 Absent
trust, investors will simply shift their capital from the marketplace to
public and private debt as a less risky alternative. Accordingly, trust is
410crucial to the success of the marketplace and the public corporation.
Instilling and maintaining trust in the marketplace for entrepreneurial
and Legal Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 38 (2005) ("If
an overly busy person serves on the boards of five public companies . . . , takes on
challenging duties on each of those boards, and then finds himself in a situation where one
of his companies is accused of serious wrongdoing that the board arguably should have
prevented, he should not be surprised if his good faith comes under severe attack in the
financial press and in the courts.").
407. Cf Theresa A. Gabaldon, Love and Money: An Affinity-Based Model for the
Regulation of Capital Formation by Small Businesses, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
259, 280-81 (1998) (arguing that requiring affirmative duties inspires more trust in
fiduciary conduct than merely providing avenues for vulnerable victims of misconduct to
receive redress).
408. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d. 27 (Del.
2006).
409. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 212, at 214 ("The Delaware courts' recent
articulations of the duty of good faith respond to a deep need to find ways to restore trust
in corporate directors."); cf Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, A New Direction for Shareholder
Environmental Activism: The Aftermath of Caremark, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 163, 176 (2006) (noting that compliance programs preserve the reputation of a
firm).
410. See Lynn A Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 408
(2002) ("Investor trust provides the foundation on which the American securities market
has been built."). Federalism can only maintain a degree of investor trust by guaranteeing
that the federal government will intervene in intra-corporate internal affairs to police
abusive management behavior. Provided such laws are vigorously enforced, it simply
gives investors some degree of assurance that near-criminal behavior will be prosecuted.
As long as investors believe that such norms are effective to deter undesirable behavior,
that belief restores a measure of trust, but only against near-theft and waste.
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enterprises in competition with other forms of risk investment can only
be maintained by some meaningful positive duty that directors act in the
best entrepreneurial interests of the shareholders. The question is then,
simply, how effective directorial fiduciary duties are in maintaining that
trust. Certainly, the fiduciary duty of care cannot be relied upon to instill
or maintain trust. At the moment, care has been reduced to an
exculpable and indemnifiable minimum. After Disney, it is difficult to
argue that care is so meaningful a standard bearer for shareholder trust
that directors will take care of the corporation and its best interests. In
order to induce qualified directors to serve, the risk of liability for risky
decision-making has been reduced to sanction even grossly negligent
behavior, provided the director subjectively believed that the decision
was in the best interests of the company.a Subjective belief in the
correctness of a decision later proven to be grossly negligent but
nonetheless rational does little to maintain investor trust. Of course, it
may make directors more comfortable with even sloppy behavior and
could, therefore, increase the pool of persons willing to serve in that
capacity, but is that outcome alone adequate? Is a fiduciary duty truly
meaningful to the beneficiary of the duty when it is reduced to such
minimal levels? Such a proposition is highly doubtful. The only way to
seriously argue that the duty of care is meaningful to the investment
community is to claim that the community simply does not and has not
internalized how the duty of care has been reduced to near
inapplicability as a liability standard. But such an understanding gap
assumes enormous market inefficiencies without adequate proof.
The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, has more marketplace trust
potential and promise,412 especially after Disney and Stone. By Disney
first identifying that bad faith encompasses serious abdication or
dereliction of directorial duties, and Stone conflating bad faith into
loyalty, as well as freeing loyalty from its prior economic interest
constraints, the Delaware Supreme Court has revitalized trust by
413
mandating meaningful diligence to directorial duties. Of course,
liability follows only from systematic or serious duty abdications, but the
exact contours of "systematic" are not clearly defined. That mystery, as
defined by further Delaware case law, offers the best hope for restoring
411. See discussion supra Part IlI.E.
412. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1661-62 (2001)
("[T]he role of the duty of loyalty is to provide a check on directorial or controlling
shareholder opportunism.").
413. See discussion supra Part III.F; see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell,
Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1769,
1774-75 (2007).
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and maintaining marketplace trust, especially after serious public cases
like Enron.
H. Conclusion Regarding For-Profit Judicial Fiduciary Duties
The Disney and Stone cases first developed the contours of "good
faith" and then conflated it with "duty of loyalty," while at the same time
freeing loyalty from its traditional Delaware economic interest
limitations. In so doing, the Delaware Supreme Court internalized social
norms into Delaware corporate governance jurisprudence by requiring
an affirmative element of devotion to directorial duties. This approach
arguably improves the clarity of a simple Caremark abdication of duty
claim414 by maintaining the viability of the action, while emphasizing that
the abdication must be systematic to implicate the bad faith destruction
of exculpation and indemnification. While the Delaware courts could
have chosen a different path for bad faith, such as removing the
protection of both the business judgment rule and exculpation, the path
chosen has other advantages. The most significant is the indoctrination
of social norms of loyalty into Delaware corporate governance.
Additionally, the path chosen arguably allows for a correction of the
Cede formulation, applying the entire fairness test to duty of care cases.
Now that loyalty has been released from its economic interest shackles,
there is little reason to continue to apply entire fairness to justify a duty
of care violation at any level.
IV. FEDERAL TAX GOVERNANCE OF NONPROFIT SELF-DEALING AND
EXCESS TRANSACTIONS: OBSCURE POLICING THE DUTIES OF LOYALTY
AND CARE
The term "nonprofit" organization has many meanings in different
contexts. The most common definition focuses on the legal
"nondistribution constraint 4 15 prohibiting the organization from
distributing profits or net earnings to persons controlling the entity such
411as members, officers, directors, and trustees. Under this formulation, a
nonprofit organization is not prohibited from making a profit, but any
such earnings must be retained and devoted exclusively to financing the
411services the organization was formed to provide. Other formulations
414. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
415. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980).
416. Id.
417. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and
Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1065
(2000). Minow analyzes the meaning of three lines, vital to constitutional free enterprise
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exist and focus on "altruism, [the] level of support through donations, or
the products they supply. '41'  Federal tax law does not dictate the
organizational charitable form and Form 990 does not identifyorganizational form.420
A. Federal Tax Definition of Nonprofit Organization
Federal tax law does adopt the nondistribution restraint formulation,
albeit in a private inurement construct,42' as a qualification for all
democracy, that have been fading, shifting, and criss-crossing: the lines "between public
and private, profit and non-profit, and secular and religious." Id. at 1080.
418. Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 144
(2007); see also Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501,
565 (1990).
419. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1990). Most tax-exempt
organizations are organized under specific state nonprofit "corporation" statutes.
However, § 501(c)(3) also interprets the term "nonprofit corporation" to include
unincorporated associations (including limited liability companies) and charitable trusts.
Id. (noting that definitions of the terms "articles" or "articles of organization" generally
include "the trust instrument, the corporate charter, the articles of association, or any
other written instrument by which an organization is created"). Because a trustee's
fiduciary duties arguably exceed those of a comparable charitable board of directors, most
charitable organizations are organized as corporations and not trusts. Limited liability
companies have more contractual flexibility with regard to fiduciary duties. However, if a
limited liability company is "determined to be, or claims to be," an exempt organization, it
will be "deemed" to have made an election to be classified as an association taxable as a
corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(A) (as amended in 2006). Moreover, most
state laws require nonprofit organizations to be in the form of non-stock entities, so there
are no "owners" of the entity or its profits. In a state that permits a limited liability
company to be formed and operated with no economic members, this condition might be
satisfied. However, most state limited liability company laws require any limited liability
company to have members. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(6) (2001)
("'Limited liability company' .. means a limited liability company formed under the laws
of the State of Delaware and having 1 or more members."). For this reason, limited
liability companies are used mostly in joint ventures with another tax-exempt entity or as a
wholly owned subsidiary of such entity. See A. L. Spitzer, The IRS Stakes Out Its Position
on Joint Ventures: But Is It Defensible?, SD32 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
COURSE OF STUDY 133, 136-37 (1998); see also infra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
420. See Form 990, supra note 55. "[E]very organization exempt from taxation under
section 501(a)," including, therefore, § 501(c)(3) charitable private foundations and
charitable public charities, must file an annual tax return. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1). Neither
churches nor public charities with less than $5,000 annual gross receipts, however, need to
file annual returns. Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). The annual filing must be on Form 990 for
public charities and Form 990-PF for private foundations. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(i)
(1971). The treasury regulations control the information to be reported. See, e.g., Treas.
Reg. § 1.6033-3 (1985) (requiring private foundations to report additional information,
send a copy to the attorney general's office, and file notice to the public of its inspection
availability).
421. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (providing in part that "no part of the net earnings [may]
inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual").
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charitable organizations seeking exemption from federal income
422taxation . Most nonprofit organizations are exempt from taxation
because they are "charitable" under § 501(c)(3). 423  The status is not• • 424
automatic and must be approved by application. The status is an
important fund-raising element because donors are permitted to take a
federal tax deduction for the amount of contributions to such "donative
charities ' '42' and private foundations and governmental agencies
generally make grants only to such tax-exempt organizations. Other
"commercial charities" raise funds through commercial-style operating
activities designed to further their charitable purposes.42' The latter often
"compete" with commercial and governmental agencies providing the
same services, particularly in the health care industry. While this feature
often creates questions regarding whether a hospital should enjoy
favored tax-exempt status, the exemption has been empirically defended
on the basis that the nonprofit hospital generally satisfies a public
interest by providing services that are unlikely to be offered by for-profit
and government hospitals. 42' Nonetheless, the need for capital bynonprofit hospitals has created a splurge of joint venture activity with
422. Id. § 501(a).
423. Id. § 501(c)(3). The tax exemption for charitable organizations is quite ancient,
predating the income tax system and originating with various pre-income tax tariff
exemptions. See James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX
LAW. 523, 525 (1976).
424. An organization must file an application in order to obtain tax-exempt status.
I.R.C. § 508(a)(1) (2000). The notice must be filed on Form 1023 within fifteen months
after the organization was formed. Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1995);
Form 1023, supra note 54. Certain organizations are exempt from the application process.
First, there is a small exemption for public charities (but not private foundations) with
gross receipts of less than $5,000 per year. Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(i)(b). Also,
churches need not file an application. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-
1(a)(3)(i)(a). An organization that fails to timely file a required Form 1023 application is
presumed a private foundation. I.R.C. § 508(b). While non-private foundation status
appears constitutional, other exemptions from filing requirement may not be
constitutional after Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See Wendy Gerzog
Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 345, 345 (1990).
425. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000) (allowing a federal income tax deduction for a "charitable
contribution"). A charitable contribution is defined, most importantly, by I.R.C. §
170(c)(2), as one made to an organization essentially described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Id. §
170(c)(2).
426. See James J. McGovern, Partnerships or Joint Ventures as Vehicles to Achieve
Charitable Objectives, 31 CATH. LAW. 112, 113-14 (1987). While donative and commercial
charities are generally exempt from federal taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a), they remain
taxable on unrelated business income. I.R.C. § 501(a)-(c).
427. See generally Horwitz, supra note 418 (arguing that tax-exempt nonprofit
hospitals act in the public interest by providing services unlikely to be offered by
government or for-profit hospitals, thereby justifying the continued existence of the public
charity tax exemption for such institutions).
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various for-profit organizations.4" The joint venture structure places
additional pressures on operating exclusively for charitable purposes and
generally requires the charitable institution to maintain operating control
over the joint venture to assure devotion to the charitable mission rather
than a profit motive.9
B. Public Charities and Private Foundations
While donative and commercial charities share a common public
charitable purpose requiring organization and operation exclusively for
charitable purposes,430 classification is importantly further subdivided
into two separate charitable nonprofit organization categories: "public
charities" and "private foundations., 431 The term "private foundation" is
defined in § 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code simply by excluding
organizations specifically defined as "public charities., 432 Consequently,
all § 501(c)(3) organizations not specifically defined as "public charities"
are considered private foundations.
428. McGovern, supra note 426, at 115-16; see also John D. Colombo, In Search of
Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1074-75 (2006).
429. See generally CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX & BUSINESS LAW $1 1.09 (2007), available at 2000 WL
713734.
430. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1),(c)(1) (as amended in 1990); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(providing that the charity must be "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition, . . . or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals"); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 429, T 1.09[1][b]
(describing the exclusivity test as only generally requiring that the organization operate
"primarily" for charitable purposes, further meaning that no more than an "insubstantial"
part of its activities may be devoted to non-charitable operations).
431. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 179-81 (arguing the public/private distinction is an
outdated proxy for the donor control metric and substantially undermines large
community foundations). The recent gift to the Gates Foundation by Warren Buffet is an
excellent example. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has a current endowment of
approximately $38.7 billion, including the first Warren Buffet donation of $1.6 billion.
When the $31 billion Buffet gift is complete, the donation endowment will reach more
than $65 billion. See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Foundation Fact Sheet,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/MediaCenter/FactSheet/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2007); Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation, Implementing Warren Buffett's Gift, http://www.
gatesfoundation.org/aboutus/relatedinfo/buffett.htm (last visited, Apr. 28, 2008); see also
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1511-12 (2007)
(book review).
432. I.R.C. § 509(a) (West Supp. 2007).
433. See id.
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C. Public Charity Defined
A public charity therefore includes any § 501(c)(3) organization
described in one of the four specific categories § 509(a).434 First, a public
charity includes an organization described in § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vi).
4 3
1
These include various publicly supported charities and three "automatic"
public charities not subject to a public support test: churches,436
educational institutions,437 and hospitals (including medical research
institutions).4 " The remaining categories of organizations that fall under
§ 170(b)(1) are those that receive a substantial amount of their support
from public (government) donations.439 Second, a public charity can be a
public service organization.440 These organizations must receive more
than one-third of their income from small public donations441 and not
receive more than one-third of their income from investments. 44' Third, a
public charity can be an organization organized and operated for the
benefit of other charitable organizations (supporting organizations). 44'
Finally, a public charity can be an organization "organized and operated
exclusively for testing for public safety." 44  All other organizations are
considered private foundations by exclusion.445
D. General Restrictions on Private Foundations
These definitions reveal that private foundations are generally funded
and controlled only by a few donors. Consequently, private foundations
are subject to several restrictions not imposed on public charities because
private foundations are more prone to abuse of power and a lack of real
public benefit.446 For example, private foundations are subject to special
434. See id.
435. Id. § 509(a)(1).
436. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i).
437. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
438. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii).
439. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(iv)-(vi) (including educational benefit organizations, govern-
mental units, and organizations proving public benefit services such as museums, libraries,
and the United Way).
440. Id. § 509(a)(2).
441. Id. § 509(a)(2)(A).
442. Id. § 509(a)(2)(B).
443. Id. § 509(a)(3).
444. Id. § 509(a)(4).
445. See id. § 509(a).
446. See William H. Byrnes, IV, The Private Foundation's Topsy Turvy Road in the
American Political Process, 4 HOuS. Bus. & TAX L. J. 496, 498-99 (2004) (describing the
historical derivation of the private foundation conceptualization, as well as the codification
of its treatment in the Internal Revenue Code in 1969). The governing instrument of a
private foundation must expressly state that the organization is prohibited from engaging
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reporting " 447. 44reporting requirements, a tax on net investment income," and a series
of five separate penalty excise taxes. 44 9 Donors are generally subject to
less favorable limitations on the amount that can be deducted in any one
taxable year,450 as well as a special penalty tax if private foundation status
is terminated.45'
in transactions that would subject the organization to penalty taxes. See I.R.C. §
508(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
447. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007) (requiring exempt organizations to "file an
annual return, stating specifically the items of gross income, receipts, and disbursements,
and such other information for the purpose of carrying out the internal revenue laws as
the Secretary may by forms or regulations prescribe"). A private foundation must file an
annual return on Form 990-PF. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(i) (1971); see also Internal
Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Form 990-PF: Return of Private Foundation
(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990pf.pdf. The information generally
required includes, but is not limited to: gross income (not including contributions); dues
and assessments; expenses; exempt disbursements; detailed balance sheet; donations,
names, and addresses of those contributing $5,000 or more in any one year; the names and
addresses of all officers, directors, trustees and foundation managers; the names and
addresses of the five persons receiving the most compensation in excess of $30,000; and
the number of all independent contractors receiving more than $30,000 in compensation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii). The Form 990-PF is available for inspection by the public
at the Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A) (2000). However, compensation
details are generally not available. Id. § 6104(a)(1)(C). The application and annual
reports must also be available for inspection at the charity. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A) (West
Supp. 2007). If the request is made in person, the information must be made available
immediately. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(B)(2000). Private foundations, but not public charities,
must disclose the names of their contributors. See id. § 6104(d)(3)(A). However, if an
organization fails to disclose as required, there is no private right of action to enforce the
failure. See Schuloff v. Queens Coll. Found., Inc., 165 F.3d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (holding that Congress intended that the right be enforced exclusively by the IRS
and not by private civil action).
448. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2000). The net investment tax is an annual 2% tax imposed on a
tax-exempt private foundation's "net investment income." Id. Net investment income
means the excess of "the sum of the gross investment income and the capital gain net
income" over allowable expenditures. I.R.C. § 4940(c) (West Supp. 2007). Importantly,
the net investment income tax is not imposed on public charities. This has generated
debate as to whether huge university endowments should be subject to a similar tax on net
investment income. See generally Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have
Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990).
449. I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945.
450. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000) (contributions to public charities may not
exceed 50% of the taxpayer's contribution base, while contributions to a private
foundation are limited to 30% of the contribution base). Contributions by individuals and
corporations not allowed in one taxable year may be carried forward to the next five
taxable years. Id. § 170(d)(1); I.R.C. § 170(d) (West Supp. 2007).
451. I.R.C. § 507(a), (c). Moreover, imposition of the I.R.C. § 507 termination tax also
means contributions to the organization are no longer tax deductible. I.R.C. § 508(d)(1)
(2000 & Supp.V 2005).
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The five restrictions state one affirmative obligation and four negative
covenants. First, a private foundation must annually distribute an
amount approximately equal to 5% of its investment assets to either a
public charity or to a private operating foundation.452 Failure to do so
subjects the foundation to an initial tax equal to 30% of the undistributed
required distribution.53 If the remaining amount is not distributed by the
end of the year, it is subject to a second 100% tax.4" The distribution
requirement and tax do not apply to public charities, thereby largely
enabling university endowments to grow disproportionate to their
institutional needs.
The remaining four foundation penalty taxes are in the form of
negative covenants. The first is a tax on the excess business holdings of a• 456
private foundation. An initial 10% tax and a second uncorrected 200%
tax are imposed on the excess business holdings of the foundation. 7
Unfortunately, this tax discourages large gifts of publicly traded stock to
private foundations. However, the tax is mitigated by a special rule
allowing the private foundation to dispose of the excess business holdings
within five years.458 Also, because the maximum allowable level of
ownership in a corporation by a private foundation is 20% of the voting
stock, there is little likelihood that a private foundation could control a
publicly traded corporation through concentrated ownership.
4 9
The second tax is on investments that jeopardize the private
foundation's charitable purpose.46°  An initial 10% tax and an
uncorrected 25% tax on the value of the jeopardy investment are
imposed on the foundation. 6' An additional 10% tax and uncorrected
5% tax are imposed on a foundation manager for knowingly making and
failing to correct a jeopardy investment. 4" An important exception exists
452. I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1).
453. I.R.C. § 4942(a) (West Supp. 2007).
454. I.R.C. § 4942(b) (2000).
455. See Hansmann, supra note 448, at 6-7 (arguing that other countries impose
distributional requirements on university endowments and that various proposals have
been considered in Congress to extend the tax to public charities).
456. I.R.C. § 4943 (West Supp. 2007).
457. Id. § 4943(a); I.R.C. § 4943(b)-(c) (2000).
458. I.R.C. § 4943(c)(6) (2000); see also Jeanne M. Hauch, The Role of Charitable and
Educational Foundations in Corporate Control Transactions, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 19, 24
(1992).
459. See I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2) (2000).
460. I.R.C. § 4944 (West Supp. 2007).
461. Id. § 4944(a)(1); I.R.C. § 4944(b)(1) (2000).
462. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007); I.R.C. § 4944(b)(2) (2000). The maximum
initial management tax is $10,000 and the maximum secondary tax is $20,000. I.R.C. §
4944(d)(2) (West Supp. 2007).
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
for program-related investments designed to promote charitable
purposes without a significant profit motive. 463
The third tax is on expenditures that do not generally promote
charitable purposes, such as lobbying or grants to individuals or
organizations that are not charitable.464 An initial 20% tax and an
uncorrected 100% tax are imposed on specified taxable expenditures.46 5
An additional 5% tax and uncorrected 50% tax are imposed on a
foundation manager knowingly making and failing to correct a taxable
expenditure.)
E. Foundation Self-Dealing & Charity Excess Benefit Taxes
The final excise penalty tax is imposed separately and differently on
self-dealers and management of private foundations and public charities,• 467
but never on the entity itself. Because the Internal Revenue Service
enforces the tax as violations are discovered through mandatory
information filings, the enforcement cost is low. All nonprofit
corporations that desire tax-exempt status must file an application on
Form 1023 and an annual report on Form 990.4 These reports are being
revised to require increased disclosure to enable detection of actionable• 469
self-dealing and excess benefit transactions. While these forms are
available upon request from both the IRS and the charity, the request
process is cumbersome and timely, resulting in a lag of information. Far
greater transparency would result if charities are required to timely post
the forms on a website maintained by the charity.
Because private foundations and public charities are treated
differently, they are analyzed separately below. However, there are many
overlaps, particularly regarding the management approval tax elements.
463. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2000).
464. See I.R.C. § 4945 (West Supp. 2007).
465. Id. § 4945(a)(1); I.R.C. § 4945(b)(1) (2000).
466. I.R.C. § 4945(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007); I.R.C. § 4945(b)(2) (2000). The maximum
initial management tax is $10,000 and the maximum secondary tax is $20,000. I.R.C. §
4945(c)(2) (West Supp. 2007).
467. I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 2007).
468. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(i) (1971); supra note 425.
469. See Reiser, supra note 22, at 568-80 (discussing various state and federal
proposals for disclosure regulation of nonprofits, particularly a Senate Finance Committee
discussion draft proposal that would increase the disclosures required by Form 990 in an
effort to improve nonprofit accountability).
470. See id. at 578 (noting that the Senate Finance Committee proposal calls for
mandatory electronic filing of Form 990). Most enforcement cases are initiated by inside
whistleblowers and the press. Greater transparency would result in greater enforcement
to prevent the charity management from playing the audit lottery (hoping to avoid an
audit after filing false information).
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In the end, it will become evident that in many instances the excise tax
regime imposes more stringent standards than imposed by state fiduciary
duty law. Nonetheless, in many instances, those taxes are related to or
dependent upon some semblance of a state fiduciary duty.
1. Private Foundations
A fourth tax is imposed on "self-dealing between a disqualified person
and a private foundation., 47' Roughly stated, this excise tax imposes a
two-tier monetary penalty on the self-dealer and equates to a stricter
duty than developed under the remaining duty of loyalty discussed in
Part III above. First, an initial "breach of duty of loyalty" tax is imposed
on the self-dealer for engaging in a self-dealing transaction.4" Then, a
second tier penalty tax follows unless the self-dealer makes complete
restitution to the foundation by unwinding the transaction.473
a. Self-Dealer Tax
An initial 10% tax is imposed on any disqualified person (but not the
foundation itself) on the amount or value of any self-dealing transaction
between that person and a private foundation.74 It is generally irrelevant
whether the self-dealer knew the act constituted self-dealing.475 The
amount involved is generally the sum of the money and fair market value
of property given or received, except with regard to excess compensation
transactions where the amount involved is only the "excess"
compensation.
If not corrected within the taxable period,476 there is an additional
200% tax imposed on the self-dealer.477 Correction generally requires
"undoing the transaction" and also requires that the private foundation
be put in the same position as would have occurred had the self-dealer
been dealing with the private foundation according to the "highest
fiduciary standards., 478 For example, in a prohibited sale of property to
471. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
472. Id.
473. I.R.C. § 4941(b)(1) (2000); see also id. § 4941(e)(3).
474. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1).
475. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-i (as amended in 1973).
476. The taxable period generally begins with the date of self-dealing and ends on the
earliest of three dates, generally meaning that the transaction must be corrected before a
notice of deficiency with regard to the initial tax is issued. I.R.C. § 4941(e)(1) (2000);
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-l(a).
477. I.R.C. § 4941(b)(1).
478. Id. § 4941(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1(c).
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the foundation for cash, correction usually involves a return of the cash
to the foundation.479
A "disqualified person" broadly includes, among others, a substantial
contributor, a foundation manager, an owner, or a family member of any
of these.4" A foundation manager is defined to include an officer,
trustee, or director and any other person having similar powers. 48 ' Also
included in the definition of foundation manager are foundation
employees with "authority or responsibility with respect to any act (or
failure to act). ' ,412 It is clear, therefore, that both managers and directors
are subject to the same self-dealing standards.
Self-dealing is broadly defined to include any transaction between a
disqualified person and the foundation:
[T]he term "self-dealing" means any direct or indirect-
[(i)] sale or exchange, or leasing, of property between a
private foundation and a disqualified person;
[(ii)] lending of money or other extension of credit between a
private foundation and a disqualified person;
[(iii)] furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a
private foundation and a disqualified person;
[(iv)] payment of compensation (or payment or
reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a
disqualified person;
[(v)] transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified
person of the income or assets of a private foundation; and
[(vi)] agreement by a private foundation to make any
payment of money or other property to a government official
... other than an agreement to employ such individual for any
period after the termination of his government service if such
479. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(e)-1(c)(1).
480. I.R.C. § 4946(a), (d) (2000) ("[T]he family of any individual shall include only his
spouse, ancestors, children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, and the spouses of
children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren.").
481. Id. § 4946(b)(1). A person is "considered an officer of a foundation ... if [hle is
specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, bylaws, or other
constitutive documents of the foundation; or ... [h]e regularly exercises general authority
to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the foundation." Treas. Reg. §
53.4946-1(f)(2) (1972). But a person possessing "authority merely to recommend
particular administrative or policy decisions, but not to implement them without approval
of a superior, is not an officer." Id. Moreover, the term does not include "such
independent contractors as attorneys, accountants, and investment managers and advisers,
acting in [those] capacities." Id.
482. I.R.C. § 4946(b)(2).
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individual is terminating his government service within a 90-day
period.
Applied literally, the prohibition on compensation for services would
prevent any disqualified person from working for the private
foundation! Accordingly, a special exception permits a disqualified
person to receive reasonable compensation for services provided the
payment is not excessive..4 " The services must be necessary to carry out
the charitable mission of the foundation and the payment must be
reasonable. 8
This approximates the duty of loyalty in the context of for-profit and
nonprofit governance law. Moreover, the self-dealing amount is only the
compensation in excess of reasonable compensation.4 7  This
approximates the "fairness" exemption for conflict of interest
transactions. Because of these definitions, almost all self-dealing
transactions are directly prohibited, except the rendering of services to
the foundation in exchange for reasonable compensation.4 The 200%
uncorrected tax on the self-dealer makes such transactions extremely
expensive and, thus, generally makes 100% restitution to the foundation
much less expensive. However, the low 10% initial tax may enter into
the personal calculus of whether to enter into the transaction. Initially,
the self-dealing transaction might not be identified as such by the
Internal Revenue Service, thus encouraging the disqualified person to
play the audit lottery. Even if detected, the penalty is simply 10% plus
restitution. Once imposed, the initial tax may not be abated, 89 though• 490
the taxpayer may avoid the second-tier tax correction.
483. Id. § 4941(d)(1). The statute then provides a series of special rules regarding self-
dealing transactions. First, a transfer of property is treated as a prohibited sale if a
foundation assumes a mortgage placed on the property by the disqualified person within
the prior ten years. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(A). Second, a disqualified person may lend money
interest free to the foundation, provided the loan is used to carry out the charitable
mission of the foundation. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(B). Third, a disqualified person may furnish
goods or services to a foundation as long as there is no charge and the goods are used in
furtherance of the charitable mission of the foundation. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(C). Fourth, a
foundation may furnish goods and services to a disqualified person provided the
foundation is fairly compensated, just as it would have been had it been dealing with the
general public and not with a disqualified person. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(D).
484. See id. § 4941(d)(1)(D).
485. Id. § 4941(d)(2)(E).
486. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1984).
487. I.R.C. § 4941(e)(2) (2000).
488. See supra note 483 (listing three other limited exceptions).
489. I.R.C. § 4962(a)-(b) (2000).
490. See id. § 4941(b).
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b. Foundation Manager Approval Tax
In addition to the two-tier tax on the self-dealer discussed above, a
two-tier management approval excise tax may also apply to managers
who were not self-dealers.491
The "approval" excise taxes include an initial 5% tax and an additional
50% tax if the transaction is not corrected.4 2 The tax is imposed on the
participation of the foundation manager only when the manager actually
knew the transaction was a self-dealing act, but is not imposed when
"such participation is not willful and is due to reasonable cause., 493
Liability is joint and several when the tax is applicable4 94 but the
management approval tax is limited to a maximum of $20,000 for each of
the first- and second-tier taxes.49 ' The second-tier tax encourages the
manager to police the disqualified person's restitution of the original act
of self-dealing. When the disqualified person makes restitution to avoid
the imposition of the 200% uncorrected tax, the manager avoids the
second 50% uncorrected tax.
The foundation manager approval tax is only applicable when "(i) [a]
tax is imposed [on a self-dealer], (ii) [the] participating foundation
manager kn[ew] that the act [was] an act of self-dealing, and (iii) [t]he
participation by the foundation manager [was] willful and [was] not due
to reasonable cause., 496  Several key terms are specifically defined.
"Participation" is defined to "include silence or inaction," or an
abdication of duties, where the foundation manager "is under a duty to
speak or act, as well as any affirmative action by such manager.,
497
Participation does not include any self-dealing where the foundation
manager opposed the act "consistent with the fulfillment of his
responsibilities to the private foundation. 49 8 The foundation manager
"knows" the conduct constitutes self-dealing only where:
(i) He has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based
solely upon such facts, such transaction would be an act of self-
dealing,
491. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007); I.R.C. § 4941(b)(2) (2000). Notably, if the
self-dealer is also a foundation manager, both the self-dealer and management approval
excise taxes are imposed on the same person. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-1(a)(1)(iii) (as
amended in 1973). For the definition of foundation manager, see supra notes 481-82 and
accompanying text.
492. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2); I.R.C. § 4941(b)(2) (2000).
493. I.R.C. § 4941(a)(2).
494. I.R.C. § 4941(c)(1) (2000).
495. I.R.C. § 4941(c)(2) (West Supp. 2007).
496. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-1(b)(1).
497. Id. § 53.4941(a)-1(b)(2).
498. Id.
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(ii) He is aware that such an act under these circumstances
may violate the provisions of Federal tax law governing self-
dealing, and
(iii) he negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to
ascertain whether the transaction is an act of self-dealing, or he
is in fact aware that it is such an act.49
Moreover, while the term "knows" does not mean merely having "reason
to know," the latter is relevant evidence to establish actual knowledge.5°°
"Willful" is defined to be voluntary, conscious, and intentional conduct.
50 1
As a defense, the foundation manager's participation is excused when
it is due to reasonable cause, meaning that the manager "exercised his
responsibility on behalf of the foundation with ordinary business care
and prudence."5°2 This generally means that the approval excise tax will
not be imposed where the duty of care is satisfied. It is unclear whether
the duty of care is protected by the normative corporate governance
business judgment rule, but presumably this would be so. Indeed, the
government has the burden to prove liability for the tax... so the business
judgment rule should protect a director from an allegation that the duty
of care was not satisfied, at least when a decision has been made. Finally,
a foundation manager can avoid the approval excise tax if he relied on
the advice of counsel. 4 Thus, provided a foundation manager "relies on
the advice of [legal] counsel expressed in a reasoned written legal
opinion that an act is not an act of self-dealing," the manager will be
protected as long as counsel was fully advised as to all relevant facts.5 5
This remains true even if the transaction is later determined to constitute
an act self-dealing. 6 An opinion is "'reasoned' even if it reaches a
conclusion which is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as
such opinion addresses itself to the facts and applicable law."5 7 An
opinion is not reasoned within the definition "if it does nothing more
than recite the facts and express a conclusion. '"508 Importantly, the
absence of an opinion does not create "any inference that [the manager]
participated.., knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause."5 °9
499. Id. § 53.4941(a)-l(b)(3).
500. Id.
501. Id. § 53.4941(a)-l(b)(4).
502. Id. § 53.4941(a)-l(b)(5).
503. I.R.C. § 7454(b) (2000).
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This statutory summary establishes that these excise taxes reasonably
reflect the duties of loyalty and care imposed by the 1987 and the 2008
RMNPCA on managers and directors of nonprofit corporations
classified as private foundations, as discussed in Part II and expanded
upon in Part III. Indeed, in many cases, the "excise tax" duty of loyalty
is stronger than the duty of loyalty imposed by state law, which generally
only requires basic fairness. Basic fairness is not a defense to the self-
dealing tax nor to the management approval tax. The tax on the self-
dealer is an absolute prohibition except for narrow exceptions, including
reasonable compensation. The federal excise tax duty of care for a
director approving a self-dealing transaction is also greater than that
applicable to for-profit directors. Because fairness is not a defense,
normally only a reasoned opinion of counsel that the transaction is not
self-dealing will exonerate the director from the tax. In the absence of
such an opinion, the government will argue that the absolute prohibition
against self-dealing should give directors of private foundations adequate
notice that every transaction between management and the foundation
involves self-dealing.1
2. Public Charities
The self-dealing penalty excise taxes apply only to private foundations,
and not to public charities. " ' However, a public charity is subject to a. .• 512
separate tax on excess benefit transactions not applicable to a private
foundation.513 Until the 1996 enactment of the excess benefit tax, such
transactions threatened the tax-exempt status of the charity because of
their violation of the private inurement prohibition.514 The applicable
taxes are imposed on any disqualified person that engages in an excess
benefit transaction and any manager who knowingly approved the
transaction, and in neither case is the tax imposed on the organization.
515
510. See generally I.R.C. § 4941 (West Supp. 2007).
511. See id. § 4941(a).
512. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2000).
513. Id. § 4958(e).
514. See Allison M. Sawyer, Student Article, Intermediate Sanctions: Protection for
Charitable Organizations and the Donations They Receive, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
125, 132-33 (2003). Technically, private inurement could result in the loss of tax
exemption and also trigger the imposition of the excess benefit tax. However, Congress
generally intended revocation of the tax-exempt status only where the transaction
threatens the charitable basis and nature of the organization. See Caracci v. Comm'r, 118
T.C. 379, 414 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding no
excess benefit).
515. I.R.C. § 4958(a)-(b) (2000).
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a. Self-Dealer Tax
The excess benefit tax imposes an initial 25% tax on any disqualified
person who becomes a self-dealer by engaging in an excess benefit
transaction. 6 A second 200% tax is imposed if the excess benefit is not
timely restored to the public charity '17 Correction to avoid the second
tax requires "undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and
taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a
financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the
disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary
standards.""5 ' Accordingly, as with private foundations, it is far less
expensive to unwind the transaction by making restitution to the public
charity than to incur the second 200% tax.
Because public charities are more likely to be involved with other
organizations, the definition of a disqualified person is somewhat
different than for the definition of private foundations. A disqualified
person includes: (i) "any person who was, at any time during the 5-year
period ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise
substantial influence over the affairs of the organization";. 9 (ii) a family
member of such an individual; 2 (iii) "a 35-percent controlled entity";521
(iv) any of these persons with respect to another public charity organized
to carry out the purposes of the public charity engaged in the
transaction;22 (v) the donor or donor advisor of a donor advised fund;'1
3
and (vi) any investment advisor in a sponsoring organization. A 35%
controlled entity is defined to include:
(i) a corporation in which persons [with substantial influence
or their family members] own more than 35 percent of the total
combined voting power;
(ii) a partnership in which such persons own more than 35
percent of the profits interest, and
516. See id. § 4958(a)(1). An "excess benefit transaction" is "any transaction in which
an economic benefit is provided by [a public charity] directly or indirectly to or for the use
of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value
of the consideration ... received for providing such benefit." Id. § 4058(c)(1)(A). The
"excess benefit" is the excess amount involved in an excess benefit transaction. Id. §
4958(c)(1)(B).
517. Id. § 4958(b).
518. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6) (West Supp. 2007).
519. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A).
520. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2007).
521. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(C).
522. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(D).
523. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(E), (f)(7).
524. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(F), (f)(8).
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(iii) a trust or estate in which such persons own more than 35• • •525
percent of the beneficial interest.
Special constructive ownership rules apply to determine the outcome of
these ownership tests.526 If more than one person is liable for the tax, the
liability is joint and several.527
b. Charitable Manager Approval Tax
As with the private foundation self-dealing tax, there is also a 10% tax
imposed on the amount of the excess benefit on any organization• 521
manager who participated in the transaction. Unlike with private
foundations, there is no second tax imposed on an organization manager
if the transaction is not corrected.12' But, like private foundations, the
maximum tax imposed upon approving managers is $20,000."30
An organization manager is defined more narrowly than a disqualified
person to include only "any officer, director, or trustee" of a public
charity or "any individual having powers or responsibilities similar to
those of officers, directors, or trustees., 531 A person is an "officer" if he
is "specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, by-
laws, or other constitutive documents of the organization; or [r]egularly
exercises general authority to make administrative or policy decisions on
behalf of the organization. 53 2 But a person is not an officer if he has
"authority merely to recommend particular administrative or policy
decisions, but not to implement them without approval of a superior," or
if he is an independent contractor, such as an attorney or accountant.533
Under a special rule, "[a]n individual who is not an officer, director, or
trustee, yet serves on a committee of the governing body" of a public
charity may nonetheless be deemed an organization manager.
534
The tax is imposed if the manager participated in the excess benefit
transaction knowing it to be an excess benefit transaction, unless such
participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause.535 Thus,
while the excess benefit tax on the disqualified person imposes strict
525. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(3)(A) (2000).
526. Id. § 4958(f)(3)(B); see also id. § 4946(a)(3)-(4).
527. Id. § 4958(d)(1).
528. Id. § 4958(a)(2).
529. See id. § 4958(b) (providing for an additional tax imposed on disqualified person,
but no similar tax imposed on management).
530. I.R.C. § 4958(d)(2) (West Supp. 2007).
531. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2) (2000).
532. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i) (2002).
533. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(i)(B).
534. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(2)(ii).
535. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2) (2000).
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liability and does not depend upon knowledge that the transaction
resulted in an excess benefit, the manager participation standard is
subject to a willful requirement and may be avoided if participation was
due to reasonable cause. The manager therefore has several levels of
defense not available to the disqualified person who received the excess
benefit. First, the manager participation must be "knowing," meaning
536actual knowledge. However, facts demonstrating a reason to know are
relevant in proving actual knowledge. 37  A manager knowingly
participates in an excess benefit transaction only when (i) the person has
"actual knowledge of sufficient facts" that demonstrate (on those facts
alone) that the transaction is an excess benefit transaction; (ii) the person
is aware that these acts may violate federal tax laws governing excess
benefit transactions; and (iii) the person either is aware that it is an
excess benefit transaction or negligently fails to determine whether it is
538such a transaction.
Importantly, even when the manager suspects the transaction is an
excess benefit transaction, the penalty will not apply where reliance is
based on a reasoned opinion. 39 An opinion is "reasoned," even though it
incorrectly concludes that the transaction was not an excess benefit
transaction, as long as the opinion considers and addresses both the
relevant facts and applicable law; an opinion is not reasoned if it "does
nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. 5 40 The
regulations provide that the absence of a written opinion does not, by
itself, create an inference that the manager knowingly participated.54'
Professionals who may issue reasoned opinions include "[1]egal counsel,
including in-house counsel; . . . [c]ertified public accountants or
accounting firms with expertise regarding the relevant tax law matters;
and... [i]ndependent valuation experts.
5 42
c. Abatement of Tax
Finally, the 200% second-tier excess benefit tax imposed on the
disqualified self-dealer may be abated if imposed and the transaction is
thereafter corrected.5 43 In addition, the first-tier tax against both the
disqualified self-dealer and the approving organization manager may be
536. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(i)(A).
537. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(ii).
538. Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(i)(A)-(C).




543. I.R.C. § 4961(a) (2000).
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abated where it is established that: (i) the excess benefit transaction "was
due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, and [(ii)] such event
was corrected within the correction period for such event."
'
4
As previously noted, the initial tax on the organization manager is
subject to a reasonable cause defense in the first instance. The initial tax
on the disqualified self-dealer is not. However, the disqualified person is
granted an opportunity for abatement on essentially the same grounds.
The abatement provisions do not extend to private foundations.5
3. Self-Dealing and Excess Benefit Comparative Analysis
Perhaps the most striking difference between the self-dealing tax on
private foundations and the excess benefit tax on public charities is that
the latter permits all fair and reasonable transactions. The private
foundation tax permits, by contrast, only reasonable compensation.
When the excess benefit tax applies, it only taxes the excess over the fair
and reasonable amount. The private foundation tax imposes a tax on the
full amount of the self-dealing transaction. In addition, it is simpler to
correct an excess benefit transaction than a self-dealing transaction,
because only the "excess" needs to be returned to the public charity,
whereas the entire self-dealing transaction must be corrected.
By way of contrast, the 1987 RMNPCA section 8.31 permits all self-
dealing or conflict-of-interest transactions provided the transaction is
either fair,546 like the excess benefit tax, or is approved in advance by
directors knowing the material facts with a good faith reasonable belief
that the transaction was fair.547 The approval must occur by a majority
vote of disinterested directors. 4 ' Thus, the excess benefit tax and the
1987 RMNPCA adopt a similar fairness standard while private
foundations are subject to a punitive tax even if the transaction was
permitted under state law. Given that nonprofit directors are often not
compensated and less financially sophisticated than for-profit directors,
and given that reporting and transparency are less direct, it is arguable
that the "reasonable belief" standard of 1987 RMNPCA section 8.31 is a
"charade" and totally ineffective. 49 Under this interpretation, the private
foundation tax approach arguably should be extended to public charities
to replace the more liberal excess benefit tax.55° While this would
544. Id. § 4962(a).
545. Id. § 4962(b); see also I.R.C. § 4941(a) (West Supp. 2007).
546. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.31(a) (1987).
547. Id. § 8.31(b)(1).
548. Id. § 8.31(e).
549. See DeMott, supra note 3, at 139-41 (1993).
550. See Hansmann, supra note 47, at 569-70.
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prohibit the public charity from participating in some beneficial
transactions, the benefit of a stricter foundation rule more than likely
outweighs the advantages of engaging in self-dealing transactions. In any
event, if the transaction is desirable, the disqualified person or
organization manager can simply dissociate from the public charity, or
otherwise restructure the transaction, in order to permit it. 5'
Of equal importance is the fact that the 1987 RMNPCA refers to a
broader "conflict-of-interest" transaction rather than a more narrow self-
dealing transaction. However, broader conflicts transactions such as
competition and opportunity doctrines are far less applicable in the
nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector.
V. CONCLUSION
Extensive problems exist regarding the enforcement of the state law
fiduciary duty of care of a charitable nonprofit corporate board to detect
and correct management excesses. Moreover, even in the for-profit
sector where the robust shareholder derivative suit remains to enforce
breaches of the fiduciary duty of care-enhanced by SOX disclosure,
information transparency, and independence-director monetary
liability is rare except in extreme systematic cases of abdication of
directorial responsibility. That said, directorial abdication is much more
likely in a more passive, captured, and volunteer charitable nonprofit
board with a diverse charitable mission. As a reasonable duty of care
surrogate for directors without financial conflicts of interest, federal
excise taxes on self-dealing and excess benefit transactions are
reasonable, government-enforced, cost-effective proxies for charitable
board inattention. The taxes, therefore, superimpose limited monetary
liability on a careless or absentee board. However, federal excise tax
liability is triggered in the first instance by a breach of the state law
fiduciary duty of care. As a result, the 2008 MNPCA has, and future
reform proposals must, maintain the current fiduciary duty scheme, even
though it seldom results in state law enforcement or liability.
Nonetheless, the true problem is that management behavior is the
normative cause of charitable nonprofit corporation abuse, often leaving
in its wake a weakened charity with a crippled reputation and inability to
sustain its charitable mission because its fund-raising ability has been
tarnished. The particular reforms discussed in this Article attack the
core of the abuse. Significant increases in the initial excise tax while
keeping the 200% penalty for failure to correct will operate as a powerful
disincentive against management excesses. Moreover, the absolute
551. See id. at 571-72.
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private foundation prohibition for self-dealing should be extended to
public charities. Although the 1987 RMNPCA authorizes "fair"
transactions in for-profit corporations, the risk of abusive transactions far
outweighs the benefits to a charitable organization from allowing "fair"
self-dealing transactions. In order to increase the likelihood of detection,
all charitable nonprofit corporations required to file an initial Form 1023
tax exemption application and annual Form 990 information report
should be required to timely post those reports to a website maintained
by the charitable institution. The press and interested public will likely
help police abuses once this information is more available. Finally,
whistleblower reforms specific to the tax should be enhanced so that
charitable insiders will be encouraged to report abuses.
